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Abstract
This paper incorporates expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
into the canonical Lucas-tree asset-pricing economy. Expectations-based loss aver-
sion increases the equity premium and decreases the consumption-wealth ratio,
because uncertain fluctuations in consumption are perceived to be more painful.
Moreover, because unexpected cuts in consumption are particularly painful, the
agent wants to postpone such cuts to let his reference point decrease. Thus, even
though shocks are i.i.d., loss aversion induces variation in the consumption-wealth
ratio, which generates variation in the equity premium, expected returns, and pre-
dictability. The level and variation in the equity premium and the predictability
in returns match historical moments, but the associated variation in intertempo-
ral substitution motives results in excessive variation in the risk-free rate. This
effect can be partially offset with variation in expected consumption growth, het-
eroskedasticity in consumption growth, or time-variant disaster risk. As a key
contribution, I show that the preferences resolve the equity-premium puzzle and
simultaneously imply plausible risk attitudes towards small and large wealth bets.
∗E-mail: MPagel@econ.berkeley.edu. I am indebted to Adam Szeidl and Matthew Rabin for their
extensive advice and support. I thank Martin Lettau, Nick Barberis, and Botond Koszegi, as well
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O’Donoghue, David Laibson, and seminar participants at UC Berkeley, Yale, and the Olin Business
School for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors remain my own.
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1 Introduction
Several leading asset-pricing models assume reference-dependent preferences that eval-
uate consumption relative to a reference point. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) assume
habit-formation1 preferences, and Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001), and Yogo (2008) use prospect-theory2 preferences. Each of these models
assume that the reference point is backward-looking and formalize it in specific ways.
Moreover, the prospect-theory models specify utility directly over financial wealth in-
stead of consumption, which implies a narrow-framing3 assumption. Koszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007, 2009) develop a new, generally-applicable model of reference-dependent
preferences in a series of influential theory papers, which successfully explains an array
of behavioral and experimental evidence. The preferences are based on consumption
and offer a fully-endogenized reference-point specification, thereby eliminating one of
the major degrees of freedom associated with prospect theory.
In an otherwise standard Lucas-tree model, expectations-based loss aversion intu-
itively implies a first-order shift and variation in the consumption-wealth ratio; the
latter of which is a new and distinct prediction in the prospect-theory asset-pricing
literature. As a result, the model matches historical levels of the equity premium, its
volatility, and the degree of predictability in returns. Remarkably, these implications
are independent of common assumptions in the literature, such as a separate process for
dividends or narrow framing.4 Moreover, I show that the preferences imply plausible
risk attitudes towards small, medium, and large wealth bets and thus make a first step
in explaining microeconomic evidence and resolving the equity-premium puzzle; this
can be seen as a key contribution to the existing literature.
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences consist of two components. “Con-
sumption utility” is determined by consumption and corresponds to the standard model
of utility. Contemporaneous and prospective “gain-loss utility” is determined by a com-
parison of current and future consumption with the reference point and corresponds to
the prospect-theory model of utility. The latter component incorporates loss aversion;
small losses are more painful than equal-sized gains are pleasurable. The reference
point is stochastic and corresponds to the agent’s fully probabilistic rational beliefs
about current and future consumption formed in the previous period. Then, the agent
1Habit formation (Abel (1990)) is a preference theory saying that people’s utility function depends
on the change in consumption rather than the level of consumption.
2Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) is a behavioral theory aimed to describe risk
preferences elicited in experiments. The theory says that people care about gains and losses relative
to a reference point, whereby small losses hurt more than equal-sized gains give pleasure, i.e., people
are loss averse.
3Narrow framing refers to the phenomenon that people appear to evaluate an offered gamble in
isolation, rather than mixing it with existing risk or considering its actual implications for consumption
instead of financial wealth.
4A separate dividend process is typically assumed to reduce the contemporaneous correlation of
consumption and returns; this, however, is not necessary in the basic model, which matches the
contemporaneous correlation reasonably well.
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compares consumption utility for each possible outcome under his updated beliefs with
consumption utility for each possible outcome under his prior beliefs, and he experi-
ences a corresponding sensation of gain or loss. Accordingly, the agent derives gain-loss
utility from unexpected changes in present consumption and revisions in expectations
over future consumption; therefore, gain-loss utility can be interpreted as utility over
good and bad news.
This paper incorporates such “news-utility” preferences into an otherwise standard
consumption-based asset-pricing model and solves for the rational-expectations equi-
librium in closed form. The model environment is a simple endowment economy with
log-normal consumption growth in the spirit of Lucas (1979). The Mehra and Prescott
(1985) model – which shows that constant relative risk aversion preferences are incon-
sistent with basic financial market moments – is preserved as a special case.
As a stepping stone to describing the model’s asset-pricing implications, I first ex-
plain two predictions about the model’s consumption-wealth ratio.5 First, the consumption-
wealth ratio is shifted down relative to the standard model. Because the agent is
loss averse, he anticipates uncertain fluctuations in gain-loss utility that are painful
on average. But, these fluctuations are less painful on a less steep part of the util-
ity curve, which introduces an additional precautionary-savings motive. Second, the
consumption-wealth ratio varies, in contrast to the standard model and despite the
i.i.d. environment. Because the agent is loss averse relative to his expectations, he
finds unexpected reductions in consumption more painful than expected reductions
in consumption; hence, the agent wants to postpone unexpected reductions in con-
sumption until his expectations will have decreased. More precisely, reducing future
consumption automatically decreases the future reference point, whereas the present
reference point is fixed. Consequently, reductions in future consumption are relatively
less painful than reductions in present consumption. Finally, these two effects on the
consumption-wealth ratio are first order as they depend on loss aversion.
These findings drive the model’s asset-pricing predictions. First, the shift of the
consumption-wealth ratio is reflected in an increased mean equity premium. Because
the agent is loss averse, he requires a high compensation for the painful fluctuations in
consumption associated with uncertainty. Second, the variation in the consumption-
wealth ratio is reflected in variation of expected returns. In bad times, the agent
desires to consume more and save less. In general equilibrium, this desire increases the
consumption-wealth ratio, decreases the price-consumption ratio, and thus increases
expected returns. Accordingly, the model generates predictability: In bad times, a high
consumption-wealth ratio predicts high future returns. Because high expected returns
have high standard deviations, which increase the price of risk, expected excess returns
are higher too. Thus, excess returns are predictable too.
I calibrate the news-utility preference parameters in line with microeconomic evi-
dence and show that this calibration generates realistic attitudes towards small, medium,
5Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) anticipate these consumption decision-making implications
in a two-period, two-outcome consumption-savings problem.
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and large wealth bets. Moreover, this calibration obtains a log equity premium of ap-
proximately six percent with a standard deviation of nineteen percent and thus matches
historical stock market data, even though consumption equals dividends in the basic
Lucas-tree model.6 Moreover, I find variation in the consumption-wealth ratio around
three percent and R2s in the predictability regressions of approximately ten percent.
These values match the empirical findings of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), who doc-
ument the medium-term predictability properties of the consumption-wealth ratio.7
Besides, I show that such strong predictability of the consumption-wealth ratio on the
return and excess return on the aggregate consumption claim is not generated by other
leading asset-pricing models.
A misprediction of the model is strong variation in the risk-free rate, which is com-
monly predicted by habit-formation models but not borne out by the data. In the event
of adverse shock realizations, the agent dislikes immediate reductions in consumption
and is unwilling to substitute intertemporally, which increases both the expected risky
and risk-free rate of return. Although not reflected in aggregate data, this underlying
time-variation in substitution motives may not be implausible in practice. Indeed, be-
cause people are unwilling to substitute intertemporally in sometimes, they use credit
cards and payday loans, thus borrowing at high interest rates. The intent of this paper
is not to change the evidence-based utility function; rather, I take the variation in sub-
stitution motives seriously and explore three model-environment extensions that partly
offset the strong intertemporal substitution effects on the risk-free rate.
First, I assume variation in expected consumption growth, as in Bansal and Yaron
(2004). Second, I assume variation in consumption growth volatility, i.e., heteroskedas-
ticity in the consumption process, as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Third, I add
disaster risk to the consumption process, so that there is a small probability that the
agent suffers a large loss in consumption, as in Barro (2006, 2009). I find that news-
utility preferences amplify disaster risk, because they feature “left-skewness aversion”,
as opposed to standard prospect-theory preferences. The addition of heteroskedasticity
or disaster risk introduces variation in the strength of the precautionary savings motive,
which partly offsets the effects of the variation in substitution motives on the risk-free
rate, adds variation in the price of risk, and generates long-horizon predictability.
Last, I quickly describe the model’s welfare implications. News utility increases the
costs of business cycle fluctuations, in the spirit of Lucas (1978), to realistic levels.
6The model’s equity premium and its volatility are increasing in the model’s simulation frequency,
which, therefore, constitutes a major calibrational degree of freedom. Taking the calibration as given, I
choose a one-and-a-half month frequency that happens to match both the historical equity premium and
its volatility. The model’s frequency matters due to the famous idea of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi
and Thaler (1995)): In contrast to standard preferences, loss aversion implies that a cumulative lottery
becomes inherently less attractive when its independent draws are evaluated more rather than less
frequently. I am intrigued by the idea that people require a large compensation for risk, because they
are subject to painful fluctuations in beliefs when they worry frequently about small fluctuations in
their future consumption.
7Furthermore, Lustig, Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2012) and Hirshleifer and Yu (2011) document
the volatility of the consumption-wealth ratio and the return on the aggregate consumption claim.
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Moreover, the first welfare theorem does not hold, because the preferences are subject
to a beliefs-based time inconsistency.8
After a literature review, I present the preferences, the model environment, and the
Markovian rational-expectations equilibrium in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Then, in section
3.3, I explain the model’s predictions about the consumption-wealth ratio. In section
4.1, I discuss the model’s asset-pricing implications and calibrate the model to gauge
its quantitative implications in section 4.2. In section 5, I extend the model to allow for
time-variant expected consumption growth, time-variant volatility, and disaster risk.
Section 6 explains the model’s implications for welfare. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Comparison to the literature
In recent years, loss aversion became a widely accepted explanation for the equity-
premium puzzle. I further this literature by showing that most results carry over to a
new, micro-founded preference specification, which has been used in a variety of con-
texts to explain behavioral and experimental evidence.9 As a result, major degrees of
freedom associated with prospect theory can be eliminated: The reference point is fully
endogenous, and tight ranges exist for all preference parameters. However, a different
calibrational degree of freedom emerges, which did not receive much attention in static
applications; the length of each time period, or the model’s simulation frequency. Sim-
ulating the model at higher frequency increases the equity premium, because the loss
averse agent finds many independent draws of a gamble less attractive than all these
8Lacking an appropriate commitment device, the agent optimizes in each period, taking his beliefs
as given. Thus, he is inclined to positively surprise himself with extra consumption in each period.
Consequently, the agent is forced to choose a sub-optimal consumption path, which differs from the
expected-utility-maximizing path on which the agent jointly optimizes over consumption and beliefs.
9Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences have been incorporated into microeconomic
models by many authors: For instance, Heidhues and Koszegi (2008, 2010); Herweg and Mierendorff
(forthcoming); Rosato (2012) explore the implications for consumer pricing, which are tested by Karle,
Kirchsteiger, and Peitz (2011). Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk (2010) analyze the implications for
optimal principal-agent contracts more generally Eisenhuth (2012) for mechanism design. Further-
more, an incomplete list of papers providing direct evidence for Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009)
preferences is: Sprenger (2010) on implications of stochastic reference points, Abeler, Falk, Goette,
and Huffman (forthcoming) on labor supply decision-making, Gill and Prowse (2012) on real-effort
tournaments, Meng (2010) on the disposition effect, and Ericson and Fuster (2010) on the endowment
effect (a finding which was contradicted by Heffetz and List (2011)). Barseghyan, Molinari, Donoghue,
and Teitelbaum (2010) structurally estimate a model of insurance deductible choice. Suggestive evi-
dence is provided by Crawford and Meng (2009) on labor supply decision-making, Pope and Schweitzer
(2011) on golf player’s performance, and Sydnor (2010) on deductible choice as well as a reading of
the numerous conflicting papers on the endowment effect which can be reconciled with the idea of
expectations determining the reference point. All of these papers consider the static model of Koszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009). But, because the dynamic preferences of Koszegi and Rabin (2009) are
a straightforward extension, the evidence is equally valid for Koszegi and Rabin (2009) preferences.
Moreover, because monetary payoffs in experiments reflect future consumption instead of contempo-
raneous consumption, all experiments that elicit preferences with monetary payoffs indirectly support
the idea that agents are loss averse over news about future consumption.
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gambles’ cumulative outcome.10 I calibrate the model in line with microeconomic evi-
dence and then choose a one-and-a-half month frequency that matches both the equity
premium and its volatility, i.e., the historical risk-return trade off. Moreover, I show
that the preferences are tractable in a multi-period, continuous-outcome framework;
this is not readily apparent given their high level of complexity.
While other models are equally able to match asset-pricing moments, news util-
ity simultaneously explains behavior observed in microeconomic studies. I show that
the preference parameters induce realistic attitudes towards small, medium, and large
wealth bets, which are not well explained by other preference specifications.11 There-
fore, I take a step forward in developing a framework that can match both macroe-
conomic and microeconomic behavior. This improved micro foundation has desirable
implications, namely variation in the consumption-wealth ratio, expected returns, and
predictability, which matches the evidence provided by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)
better than those of the standard, habit-formation, or long-run risk models. But, the
well-known problem that the risk-free rate responds strongly to intertemporal smooth-
ing incentives is not resolved. Time-variant consumption growth, heteroskedasticity, or
disaster risk is needed to offset some of the effects on the risk-free rate.
The pioneering prospect-theory asset-pricing papers, Barberis, Huang, and Santos
(2001) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995), specify gain-loss utility directly over fluctua-
tions in financial wealth. In so doing, the authors make an assumption about narrow
framing. The agent narrowly frames the stock market, because he experiences gain-
loss utility directly over financial wealth. In contrast, the news-utility agent experi-
ences gain-loss utility over the implications of his financial wealth for contemporaneous
and future consumption. The news-utility model yields a high equity premium with-
out narrow framing, because the agent experiences gain-loss utility over fluctuations
in contemporaneous consumption and the entire stream of future consumption, which
makes uncertainty sufficiently painful. Yogo (2008) argues also that fluctuations in con-
sumption rather than financial wealth are the relevant measure of risk. The author’s
preferences are a mixture of habit formation and prospect theory and yield a high eq-
uity premium; variation in the risk-free rate is mitigated via persistence in the habit
process. The main difference with respect to Koszegi and Rabin (2009) preferences is
that the reference point is backward-looking. In contrast, Andries (2011) incorporates
loss aversion into a consumption-based asset pricing model and explains positive skew-
ness premia and a flat security market line. The agent’s value function features a kink
at the expected value of consumption, which nicely captures forward-looking reference
10This result relates to myopic loss aversion and the Samuelson’s colleague story (Benartzi and
Thaler (1995)).
11Standard, habit-formation, or long-run risk preferences do not simultaneously match risk attitudes
towards small and large wealth bets, because the agent is second-order risk averse. Similarly, the
disappointment-aversion models do not robustly match such risk attitudes, because the agent is not
necessarily “at the kink”. The asset-pricing theories based on prospect theory imply plausible attitudes
towards small and large wealth bets but not consumption bets and are thus inconsistent with the
endowment-effect evidence (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (2009)).
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dependence. However, because the agent exhibits reference-dependent preferences with
respect to his future value rather than present consumption, the underlying preference
mechanisms and predictions are very different from those I obtain.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) show that habit formation matches a range of asset-
pricing moments. Moreover, this paper’s main prediction, the variation in the agent’s
willingness to substitute intertemporally, has also been emphasized by Campbell and
Cochrane (1999). But, the authors exactly offset this variation in intertemporal substi-
tution motives by a habit process that features variation in the agent’s precautionary-
savings motive. Furthermore, because the agent’s habit increases the curvature of the
value function, the agent’s effective risk aversion is quite high and becomes the main
variability-driving mechanism. The same holds true for Barberis, Huang, and Santos
(2001), variation in the coefficient of loss aversion introduces predictability, whereas
the additively separable gain-loss components over financial wealth yields a constant
consumption-wealth ratio and risk-free rate. In the news-utility model, effective risk
aversion is constant and equals the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The model
retains the power utility property that the curvature of the value function is solely de-
termined by the coefficient of relative risk aversion, as gain-loss utility is proportional
to consumption utility.
Routledge and Zin (2010) assume generalized disappointment-aversion preferences
and show that these are consistent with basic financial market moments. The model
has been extended to long-run risk by Bonomo, Garcia, Meddahi, and Tedongap (2011).
However, these models rely on high risk aversion in low states of the world when the
agent is likely to be disappointed, as habit-formation preferences do.12 Furthermore,
Campanale, Castro, and Clementi (2010) assume disappointment-aversion preferences
in a production economy. In this model the excessive volatility of the risk-free rate can
be reduced by assuming a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution. However, the
variation in returns is acyclical by construction, which rules out predictability.13
This paper contributes to the literature by incorporating a preference specification,
which has proven to be consistent with an array of micro evidence in a variety of
domains. Thus, I can relate microeconomic evidence to the model’s asset-pricing im-
plications and the intuition of which, pin down narrow ranges for all parameters, and
simultaneously match risk attitudes over small, medium, and large stakes.
12Strong variation in effective risk aversion has problems to robustly match evidence on risk attitudes
towards wealth bets and is contradicted by portfolio-choice data (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)).
13Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences are able to rationalize the equity premium with the addition
of long-run risk or heterogeneous agents as shown by Bansal and Yaron (2004). Epstein and Zin
(1989) preferences feature a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution that can be chosen as an
additional parameter in the model. A stark difference between this approach and my model is that the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is typically chosen to be above one to match financial market
moments, whereas the asset-pricing implications of Koszegi and Rabin (2009) preferences and other
micro evidence suggest a value below one.
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3 The Model
3.1 Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
I assume expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, as specified in Koszegi
and Rabin (2009). Instantaneous utility in each period is the sum of consumption
utility and gain-loss utility. The latter component consists of “contemporaneous” gain-
loss utility about current consumption and “prospective” gain-loss utility about the
entire stream of future consumption. Thus, total instantaneous utility in period t is
given by
Ut = u(Ct) + n(Ct, F
t−1
Ct
) + γ
∞∑
τ=1
βτn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ). (1)
The first term in equation (1) corresponds to consumption utility in period t, which
is a power-utility function u(c) = c1−θ
1−θ . The following terms are defined over both
consumption and the agent’s “beliefs” about consumption, which I explicitly define
below. Throughout the paper, I assume rational expectations such that the agent’s
beliefs about any of the model’s variables equal the objective probabilities determined
by the economic environment.
Definition 1. Let It denote the agent’s information set in some period t ≤ t + τ ,
then the agent’s probabilistic beliefs about consumption in period t+ τ , conditional on
period t information, is denoted by F tCt+τ (c) = Pr(Ct+τ < c|It) and F t+τCt+τ is degenerate.
To understand the following terms in equation (1), first note that the reference
point in period t are the fully probabilistic beliefs about consumption in period t and
all future periods t + τ , given the information available in period t − 1. According to
definition 1, the agent’s beliefs formed in period t− 1 about period t+ τ consumption
are denoted by F t−1Ct+τ . Thus, the second term in equation (1), n(Ct, F
t−1
Ct
), corresponds
to gain-loss utility in period t over contemporaneous consumption. Gain-loss utility is
determined by a piecewise linear value function µ(·) with slope η and a coefficient of loss
aversion λ, i.e., µ(x) = ηx for x > 0 and µ(x) = ηλx for x ≤ 0. The parameter η > 0
weights the gain-loss utility component relative to the consumption utility component
and λ > 1 implies that losses are weighed more heavily than gains; the agent is loss
averse. Because the agent compares his actual contemporaneous consumption with
his prior beliefs, he experiences gain-loss utility over “news” about contemporaneous
consumption as follows
n(Ct, F
t−1
t (C
t−1
t )) =
ˆ ∞
0
µ(u(Ct)− u(c))dF t−1Ct (c)
= η
ˆ Ct
0
(u(Ct)− u(c))dF t−1Ct (c) + ηλ
ˆ ∞
Ct
(u(Ct)− u(c))dF t−1Ct (c). (2)
The third term in equation (1), γ
∑∞
τ=1 β
τn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ), corresponds to prospective gain-
loss utility in period t over the entire stream of future consumption. Prospective gain-
loss utility about period t + τ consumption, n(F t,t−1Ct+τ ), depends on F
t−1
Ct+τ
, the agent’s
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beliefs with which he entered the period, and on F tCt+τ , the agent’s updated beliefs
about period t+ τ consumption. F t−1Ct+τ and F
t
Ct+τ
are correlated distribution functions,
because future uncertainty is contained in both prior and updated beliefs about Ct+τ .
Thus, there exists a joint distribution, which I denote by F t,t−1Ct+τ 6= F tCt+τF t−1Ct+τ . Because
the agent compares his new beliefs with his prior beliefs, he experiences gain-loss utility
over “news” about future consumption
n(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
0
µ(u(c)− u(r))dF t,t−1Ct+τ (c, r). (3)
Both contemporaneous and prospective gain-loss utility correspond to an outcome-wise
comparison as assumed in Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).14 Moreover, the agent
discounts prospective gain-loss utility exponentially by β, the standard agent’s con-
sumption utility discount factor; and prospective gain-loss utility is subject to another
discount factor γ relative to contemporaneous gain-loss utility, so that the agent puts
a weight γβτ < 1 on prospective gain-loss utility about consumption in period t+ τ .
Because both contemporaneous and prospective gain-loss utility are experienced
over news, the preferences are referred to as “news utility”.
3.2 The model environment and equilibrium
The model environment. I consider a Lucas (1979) tree model in which the sole
source of consumption is an everlasting tree that produces Ct units of consumption
each period t. I assume that consumption growth is log-normal, following Mehra and
Prescott (1985). Thus, the endowment economy’s exogenous consumption process is
given by
log(
Ct+1
Ct
) = µc + εt+1 with εt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2c ). (4)
The price of the Lucas tree in each period t is Pt. Moreover, there exists a risk-free
asset in zero net supply with return Rft+1. The period t+ 1 return of holding the Lucas
tree is then Rt+1 = Pt+1+Ct+1Pt . Each period t, the agent faces the price of the Lucas
tree Pt and the risk-free return Rft+1 and, acting as a price taker, optimally decides how
much to consume C∗t and how much to invest in the risky asset α∗t .15
14The outcome-wise comparison of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) has been generalized to an
ordered comparison in Koszegi and Rabin (2009), because the agent would otherwise experience gain-
loss disutility over future uncertainty even if no update in information takes place. I circumvent
this problem by explicitly noting that prior and new beliefs about consumption are correlated, i.e., I
generalize the gain-loss formula of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)
n(Fc, Fr) =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
0
µ(u(c)− u(r))dFr(r)dFc(c) to n(Fc,r) =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
0
µ(u(c)− u(r))dFc,r(c, r).
The ordered comparison yields qualitatively and quantitatively similar results but the model’s solution
is not as tractable.
15A benefit of the Lucas-tree environment is that the correlation structure of consumption, which is
left unspecified in equation (2) and (3), is fully determined by the exogenous market-clearing consump-
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Equilibrium prices and definition. Because the agent fully updates his beliefs
each period and the consumption process is i.i.d., I look for an equilibrium price and
risk-free return process that is “Markovian” in the sense that the price-consumption
ratio depends on the current shock only.
Definition 2. The price process {Pt}∞t=0 and risk-free return process {Rft+1}∞t=0 are
Markovian if, in each period t, the price-consumption ratio Pt
Ct
and the risk-free return
Rft+1 depend on the realization of the shock εt only, such that
Pt
Ct
= p(εt) and Rft+1 =
r(εt) with the functions p(·) and r(·) being independent of calender time t or endowment
Ct.
Facing Markovian prices and returns, the agent’s maximization problem in period t
is given by
maxCt{u(Ct) + n(Ct, F t−1Ct ) + γ
∞∑
τ=1
βτn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) + Et[
∞∑
τ=1
βτUt+τ ]}. (5)
The agent’s wealth in the beginning of period t, Wt, is determined by the portfolio
return Rpt , which depends on the risky return realization Rt, the risk-free return R
f
t ,
and previous period’s optimal portfolio share αt−1. The budget constraint is
Wt = (Wt−1 − Ct−1)Rpt = (Wt−1 − Ct−1)(Rft + αt−1(Rt −Rft )). (6)
In each period t, the agent optimally decides how much to consume C∗t , how much to
invest Wt−C∗t , and how much to invest in the risky asset α∗t . In equilibrium, the price
of the tree Pt = Wt−Ct adjusts so that the single agent in the model always chooses to
hold the entire tree, i.e., α∗t = 1 for all t, and consume the tree’s entire payoff C∗t = Ct
for all t as determined by the endowment economy’s exogenous consumption process (4).
In the following, I derive the “Markovian rational-expectations equilibrium” recursively;
in the Lucas-tree model, it corresponds to the preferred-personal equilibrium, as defined
in Koszegi and Rabin (2006).16
Definition 3. The Markovian rational-expectations equilibrium consists of a Marko-
vian price process {Pt = Ctp(εt)}∞t=0 and a risk-free return process {Rft+1 = r(εt)}∞t=0
such that the solution {C∗t , α∗t}∞t=0 of the price-taker’s maximization problem (5) sub-
ject to the budget constraint (6) satisfies goods market clearing {C∗t = Ct}∞t=0 and asset
market clearing {α∗t = 1}∞t=0.
tion process, i.e., F tCt+τ (c) = Pr(Ct+τ < c|It), It = {Ct, Pt, εt}, and
Ct+1
Ct
= eµc+εt+1 ∼ log−N(µc, σ2c )
for any t ∈ [0,∞) such that F tCt+τ = log −N(log(Ct) + τµc, τ2σ2c ) for any τ > 0.
16The personal-equilibrium solution concept introduced by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) is the family of
credible state-contingent plans, which the agent’s beliefs are rationally based on. Moreover, among all
credible state-contingent plans the agent chooses the plan that maximizes expected reference-dependent
utility going forward, the preferred-personal equilibrium. Because the agent’s plan is credible, his
behavior is time consistent. The first-order condition is derived under the premise that the agent
enters period t, takes his beliefs as given, and optimizes with respect to consumption. Moreover, he
rationally expects to behave like this in the future so that behavior maps into correct beliefs and vice
versa.
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Equilibrium existence and structure.
Proposition 1. A Markovian rational-expectations equilibrium exists.
This and the following propositions’ proofs can be found in appendices B.1 to E.1.
The equilibrium has a very simple structure and can be derived in closed form. In
each period t, optimal consumption C∗t is a fraction of current wealth Wt such that
C∗t = Wtρt. As appendix B.2 shows, the consumption-wealth ratio ρt is
ρt =
C∗t
Wt
=
1
1 + Q+Ω+γQΩ+γQ(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))
1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))
. (7)
Here, F (·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function N(0, σc) and Q and Ω
are determined by exogenous parameters. Thus, ρt varies with the realization of εt, is
i.i.d., independent of calender time t, or current endowment Ct. The price-consumption
ratio is Pt
Ct
= 1−ρt
ρt
. The agent’s value function is proportional to the power utility of
wealth Vt = u(Wt)Ψt. Ψt varies with the realization of εt, is i.i.d., independent of
calendar time t, or current endowment Ct. I now explain the news-utility agent’s first-
order condition in detail to build intuition for Q and Ω and to clarify why and how ρt
varies with εt.
3.3 Predictions about the consumption-wealth ratio
Before turning to the model’s asset pricing implications, I describe the agent’s first-order
condition to provide intuition for two predictions about the agent’s consumption-wealth
ratio, which are formalized in propositions 2 and 3 and illustrated in figure 1. Although
the first-order condition appears complicated, the terms can be easily understood one
component at a time. The agent’s consumption-wealth ratio ρt, equation 7, results from
the model’s first-order condition
C−θt (1 +ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contemporaneous gain-loss
)
= (
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ (Wt − Ct)−θ(Q+ Ω + γΩQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=− dβEt[u(Wt+1)Ψt+1]
dCt
+ γQ(ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
prospective gain-loss
)). (8)
First, for η = 0, the model collapses to the standard consumption-based asset-pricing
model with constant relative risk aversion and log-normal consumption growth assumed
by Mehra and Prescott (1985) among many others. The first-order condition becomes
C−θt = (
ρs
1− ρs )
1−θ(Wt − Ct)−θQ (9)
and results in a constant consumption-wealth ratio ρs = 1
1+Q
. Let me return to news
utility and henceforth assume that η > 0 and λ > 1. In the following, I describe the
news-utility agent’s first-order condition, equation (8), to show that, in contrast to the
standard model, the consumption-wealth ratio is shifted down and is not constant.
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The shift in the consumption-wealth ratio. The left hand side of the first-order
condition, equation (8), is simply determined by marginal consumption and gain-loss
utility over contemporaneous consumption. Marginal gain-loss utility is given by the
states that would have promised less consumption F t−1Ct (Ct), weighted by η, or more
consumption 1−F t−1Ct (Ct), weighted by ηλ, i.e.,
∂n(Ct,F
t−1
Ct
)
∂Ct
= u′(Ct)(ηF t−1Ct (Ct)+ηλ(1−
F t−1Ct (Ct))). A key technical insight here allows me to simplify the marginal gain-loss
utility term: In the Lucas-tree model, equilibrium consumption is determined by the
realization of the shock εt, which allows me to simplify F t−1Ct (Ct) = F (εt).
Let me turn to the right hand side of equation (8). The first term represents the
marginal value of savings −dβEt[u(Wt+1)Ψt+1]
dCt
= u′(Wt − Ct)(Q + Ω + γΩQ) with Q and
Ω determined by exogenous parameters. In the standard model, the marginal value of
savings is given by u′(Wt − Ct)Q. Thus, Q represents the discounted stream of future
consumption utility, and Ω represents expected gain-loss utility; the marginal value
of savings is determined by Q + Ω + γΩQ, the sum of expected consumption utility,
expected contemporaneous gain-loss utility, and expected prospective gain-loss utility
discounted by γ. Accordingly, if expected gain-loss disutility is positive Ω > 0, then
the marginal value of saving increases relative to the standard model. The underlying
intuition is that the agent anticipates gain-loss disutility that is proportional to marginal
consumption utility. Thus, fluctuations are less painful on a less steep part of the utility
curve, and the agent has an additional incentive to increase savings. Moreover, it can be
shown that the additional precautionary-savings motive is first-order, i.e., ∂Ω
∂σc
|σc=0 > 0,
because it depends on concavity of the utility curve rather than prudence as in the
standard model.
However, if the agent discounts news about the future γ < 1 he has an additional
reason to consume more today, because positive news about contemporaneous con-
sumption are overweighted. Thus, the additional precautionary-savings motive results
in the consumption-wealth ratio being lower than in the standard model, if the agent
does not discount future news too highly γ > γ¯. These ideas can be formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. If θ > 1 and γ > γ¯ with γ¯ =
ηλ−Ω
Q
Ω+ηλ
< 1 then, for all realizations of
εt, the consumption-wealth ratio in the news-utility model is lower than in the standard
model ρt < ρs. Moreover, γ¯ is decreasing in the news-utility parameters ∂γ¯∂λ ,
∂γ¯
∂η
≤ 0.17
Koszegi and Rabin (2009) state in proposition 8 that news-utility introduces an
additional first-order precautionary savings motive in a two-period two-outcome model.
Proposition 8 carries over only for θ > 1, because I consider multiplicative instead of
additive shocks. Multiplicative shocks imply that savings increase the absolute value
of tomorrow’s wealth bet, which the news-utility agent dislikes. For θ < 1, this effect
dominates the intertemporal smoothing desire. For log utility θ = 1, the two motives
17If θ > 0 and
η− ΩQ
Ω+η < γ < γ¯ then ρ
s and ρt cross at εt = ε¯t and ε¯t is decreasing in the news-utility
parameters ∂ε¯t∂λ ,
∂ε¯t
∂η ≤ 0.
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exactly offset each other and Ω = 0. Thus, if θ = 1 and γ = 1, the news-utility model
becomes observationally equivalent to the standard model.18
Variation in the consumption-wealth ratio. Let me move on to the second part
on the right hand side in the first-order condition (8) that represents marginal prospec-
tive gain-loss utility. In the absence of expected gain-loss disutility Ω = 0 and prospec-
tive gain-loss discounting γ = 1, marginal contemporaneous and prospective gain-loss
utilities would cancel out. Then, I would be back in the standard model with a propor-
tional response of consumption to wealth. However, contemporaneous marginal utility
is driven above future marginal utility due to the additional marginal value of savings
Ω > 0 so that Q+ Ω + γQΩ 6= γQ. Thus, the consumption-wealth ratio ρt varies with
the realization of εt.
Moreover, the consumption-wealth ratio is decreasing for θ > 1. Because unexpected
losses are particularly painful, the agent consumes relatively more of his wealth in the
event of an adverse shock. I first outline a simplified intuition: If the agent encounters
an adverse shock, decreasing consumption below expectations today is more painful
than decreasing consumption tomorrow when the reference point will have decreased.
If the agent encounters a positive shock he experiences less painful gain-loss fluctuations
today relative to tomorrow when the reference point will have increased. Thus, the agent
wants to delay the consumption response to shocks, which makes the consumption-
wealth ratio variable. More formally, in the event of an adverse shock, present marginal
gain-loss utility is high relative to future marginal gain-loss utility. Today’s reference
point is invariable, whereas tomorrow’s reference point will have adjusted to today’s
shock. Thus, future marginal gain-loss utility is constant whereas present marginal
gain-loss is high, and the agent wants to consume relatively more today and relatively
less tomorrow.19 The following proposition formalizes this idea.
Proposition 3. If θ 6= 1 news utility introduces variation in the consumption-wealth
ratio ∂ρt
∂εt
6= 0. Moreover, for θ > 1 the consumption-wealth ratio is decreasing ∂ρt
∂εt
< 0.
The model’s implications are illustrated in figure 1, which displays the consumption-
wealth ratio ρt as a function of the shock to consumption growth and contrasts it with
the standard agent’s ratio for two levels if σc. The corresponding calibration is given
in table 3 with λ = 2. News-utility preferences predict a downward shift and specific
variation in the consumption-wealth ratio. The shape is driven by marginal gain-loss
utility, which depends on the shock distribution ηF (εt) + ηλ(1 − F (εt)) ∈ [η, ηλ]. As
εt is characterized by a bell-shaped distribution, the variation in the consumption-
wealth ratio is bounded. The agent experiences gain-loss utility over all other states
he might have been in weighted by their probabilities. For extreme realizations of
18This result is analogous to a result for quasi-hyperbolic discounting obtained by Barro (1999).
19This prediction about consumption is loosely related to a result in Koszegi and Rabin (2009): The
authors find that in the event of surprises about wealth the agent responds asymmetrically to gains
and losses. In particular, sufficiently small unexpected gains are consumed entirely, whereas losses are
delayed.
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εt, the consumption-wealth ratio approaches its limits because the states near these
realizations have very low probabilities. ρt and ρs are displayed for two levels of σc,
which illustrates that, for a small increase in σc, the downward shift in ρt is larger
than the downward shift in ρs, because the additional precautionary savings motive is
a first-order effect, i.e., ∂ρt
∂σc
|σc→0 > 0, while the standard precautionary-savings motive
is second order.
Figure 1: Consumption-wealth ratio ρt in the news-utility and standard models.
Furthermore, the steepness or responsiveness of the consumption-wealth ratio near
the center of the distribution depends on the amount of economic uncertainty σc. The
responsiveness of the consumption-wealth ratio is determined by the extent of pain or
pleasure induced by gain-loss utility that is generally reduced for wider prior distri-
butions. For example, a moderately bad realization feels less painful if the previously
expected distribution was relatively less narrow; accordingly, the agent does not feel
the need to respond as much. Finally, the consumption-wealth ratio is skewed in the
sense that the agent underconsumes more in good times than he overconsumes in bad
times. Adverse shocks are over-weighted and thus more effectively alleviated by previ-
ously expected uncertainty. Accordingly, the consumption-wealth ratio becomes more
skewed when uncertainty increases.20
20This asymmetry can be illustrated by an increase in economic volatility σc. The consumption-
wealth ratio shifts down and becomes more skewed. In the event of an overall negative surprise,
ηF (εt) + ηλ(1 − F (εt)) will be reduced if the distribution of εt is wider because 1 − F (εt) decreases
and is over-weighted by λ, therefore, ρt will be less variable. However, in the event of an overall
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4 Asset Pricing
Now I turn to the model’s asset-pricing implications. First, I derive the expected risky
return, the risk-free return, and the equity premium. Then I illustrate the model’s main
asset-pricing predictions, namely variation in expected returns, the equity premium, and
predictability. I aim to build intuition for these asset-pricing results by connecting them
back to my prior theoretical results about the consumption-wealth ratio. Proposition
4 formalizes the main idea. In turn, I calibrate the model to gauge its quantitative
performance in section 4.2 and compare them with the asset-pricing literature.
4.1 Predictions about expected returns and the equity premium
Expected returns and the equity premium. The return of holding the entire
Lucas tree is Rt+1 = Pt+1+Ct+1Pt . I can rewrite the expected risky return in terms of the
consumption-wealth ratio ρt and consumption growth Ct+1Ct by taking expectations and
noting that Pt = Wt − Ct = Ct 1−ρtρt , i.e.,
Et[Rt+1] =
ρt
1− ρtEt[
1
ρt+1
Ct+1
Ct
]. (10)
Et[
1
ρt+1
Ct+1
Ct
] is constant because consumption growth Ct+1
Ct
= eµc+εt+1 and next period’s
consumption-wealth ratio ρt+1 are i.i.d., as reported in definition 2 such that Pt+1Ct+1 =
p(εt+1) = 1−ρt+1ρt+1 . However, Et[Rt+1] varies with the consumption-wealth ratio ρt.
I can rewrite the first-order condition as 1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1], which gives rise to the
agent’s stochastic discount factor Mt+1 derived in appendix B.2. The risk-free return
is the inverse of the conditional expectation of the stochastic discount factor
Rft+1 =
1
Et[Mt+1]
=
ρt
1− ρt (Q+ Ω + γΩQ)Et[β(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)−θΨt+1]−1. (11)
Et[β(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)−θΨt+1]−1 is constant because consumption growth Ct+1Ct = e
µc+εt+1 , the
next period’s consumption-wealth ratio ρt+1, and the value function’s proportionality
factor Ψt+1 are i.i.d. However, Rft+1 varies with the consumption-wealth ratio ρt. The
equity premium
Et[Rt+1]−Rft+1 =
ρt
1− ρt (Et[
1
ρt+1
Ct+1
Ct
]−(Q+Ω+γΩQ)Et[β(Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)−θΨt+1]−1) (12)
is characterized by a constant price of risk. The price of risk and the conditional Sharpe
ratio St =
Et[Rt+1−Rft ]
σt(Rt+1)
are constant, because the agent holds the entire stock market and
thus faces the same risk each period. However, the quantity of risk σt(Rt+1) varies with
the consumption-wealth ratio ρt.
positive surprise, increasing the returns variance increases ηF (εt) + ηλ(1 − F (εt)) so that ρt is more
variable. Accordingly, increasing the variance affects the response of ρt asymmetrically, it induces more
underconsumption in good times and less overconsumption in bad times. Although hard to detect with
the naked eye, this effect can be seen in figure 1.
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Variation in expected returns and predictability. I have shown that the ex-
pected risky return, the risk-free return, and the equity premium vary with the consumption-
wealth ratio ρt. The news-utility implications about the location and shape of the
consumption-wealth ratio ρt, which are formalized in propositions 2 and 3, directly
carry over to the expected return, the risk-free return, and the equity premium. The
variation in the expected risky return is generated by the general-equilibrium nature of
the model and driven by variation in the agent’s willingness to substitute intertempo-
rally as reflected by variation in ρt.
In bad states of the world the agent would like to delay adjustments in consumption
to let his reference point adjust. To induce the agent to consume his endowment, the
price of the Lucas tree must be low and expected returns have to be high. Thus, despite
the i.i.d. environment, the expected risky return varies to make the agent willing to
hold the entire tree each period. Moreover, the variation in the consumption-wealth
ratio generates return predictability. In particular, the realization of εt predicts the
one-period ahead return Rt+1. If εt is low then ρt the consumption-wealth ratio is high
and the one-period ahead return is high; hence, the consumption-wealth ratio positively
predicts one-period ahead returns. Moreover, this mechanism generates predictability
in excess returns through the consumption-wealth ratio. Bad states predict high fu-
ture returns, and this implies that the standard deviation of returns is also high and
the expected equity premium varies with εt. Using the same argument as above, the
realization of εt then predicts the one-period ahead excess return Rt+1 −Rft+1.
The following proposition formalizes the model’s implications for variation and pre-
dictability in returns and the equity premium.
Proposition 4. If θ > 1 then the realization of the shock εt negatively impacts the
expected risky return ∂Et[Rt+1]
∂εt
< 0, risk-free return ∂R
f
t
∂εt
< 0, and equity premium
∂(Et[Rt+1]−Rft+1)
∂εt
< 0. This implies predictive power of the period t consumption-wealth
ratio ρt regarding the period t+ 1 return Rt+1 and excess return Rt+1 −Rft+1.
For illustration, figure 2 in appendix A compares the annualized news-utility return
and equity premium with the standard model’s ones under the calibration in table 3 with
λ = 2. The expected equity premium amounts to approximately ten percent for low
values of εt and three percent for high values of εt. The high equity premium reflects
that the news-utility agent perceives uncertain fluctuations in consumption as being
much more painful than the standard agent. The equity premium’s variation stems
from variation in the quantity of risk as a result of varying intertemporal smoothing
incentives. But, the figure also illustrates how the model fails to predict reality: The
risk-free return varies considerably, a phenomenon not observed in aggregate data.21
21Because the consumption-price ratio has a similar shape to the consumption-wealth ratio, the rates
of return also correspond. Accordingly, the variation is bounded because gain-loss utility is bounded
for a bell-shaped shock distribution. Furthermore, the steepness or responsiveness of the return varies
with the amount of economic volatility, which determines the level of gain-loss feelings. Finally, due to
the skewness in the variation of the consumption-wealth ratio, expected returns are negatively skewed.
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4.2 Basic model: Calibration and moments
In the following, I calibrate the model to gauge its quantitative performance. Before
assessing the model’s ability to match asset-pricing moments, I illustrate the agent’s
risk attitudes towards small and large wealth bets. I show that the news-utility model
is able to simultaneously match evidence on small-scale and large-scale risk aversion.
4.2.1 Risk attitudes over small and large stakes.
Before moving on to the model’s asset-pricing moments I illustrate which news-utility
parameter values, i.e., η, λ, and γ, are consistent with existing micro-evidence on risk
preferences over small and large stakes and time preferences. I first show that the
news-utility model does not generate high equity premia by secretly curving the value
function to generate high effective risk aversion. On the contrary, the news-utility model
retains a value function with constant curvature, because it is proportional to the power
utility of wealth, i.e., Vt = u(Wt)Ψt such that RRAt = −WtV
′′
t
V ′t
= θ.22
In table 1, I illustrate the risk preferences over gambles of various stakes of the
standard, news-utility, habit-formation (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), and long-run
risk (Bansal and Yaron (2004)) agents. In particular, I analyze a range of 50-50 win G
or lose L gambles at an initial wealth level of 300,000 in the spirit of Rabin (2001) and
Chetty and Szeidl (2007). I elicit the agents’ risk attitudes by assuming that each of
them is presented the gamble after the shock to period t consumption growth has been
realized and all consumption Ct in period t has taken place. Thus, the news-utility agent
will experience merely prospective gain-loss utility rather than contemporaneous gain-
loss utility over the gamble’s outcome. In appendix B.6, I show that the news-utility
agent is just indifferent to the gamble if
(Q+ Ω + γQΩ)u(W¯t) = γ(0.5η(u(W¯t +G)− u(W¯t))Q+ ηλ0.5(u(W¯t−L)− u(W¯t))Q)
+ (Q+ Ω + γQΩ)(0.5u(W¯t +G) + 0.5u(W¯t − L)). (13)
The first part on the right hand side of equation (13) represents prospective gain-loss
utility, while the second part represents the same value comparison as done by the
standard agent, i.e., u(W¯t) ≶ 0.5u(W¯t + G) + 0.5u(W¯t − L). Thus, if γ were zero the
news-utility agent’s risk attitudes would be the exact same as the standard agent’s ones.
Moreover, if L and G are small but G > L this second part will certainly be positive as
u(·) is almost linear, but the first part will induce prospect-theory risk preferences over
future consumption. Although solely λ determines the sign of prospective gain-loss util-
ity, there are restrictions on the other parameters, because the positivity of the second
part may dominate the negativity of the first part if γ is small. Empirical estimates
for the quasi-hyperbolic parameter β in the βδ−model typically range between 0.7 and
22The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is disentangled and exhibits variation. The coefficient
of relative risk aversion being disentangled from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is a feature
of a broad range of non-time-separable utility functions, such as habit formation.
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0.8 (e.g., Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (forthcoming)). Thus, the experimental
and field evidence on agent’s attitudes towards intertemporal consumption trade offs
dictates a choice of γ ≈ 0.8 when β ≈ 1.
Simultaneously, the model should match risk attitudes towards bets about immedi-
ate consumption, which are determined solely by η and λ, because it can be reasonably
assumed that utility over immediate consumption is linear. Thus, η = 1 and λ ≈ 2.5 is
dictated by the laboratory evidence on loss aversion over immediate consumption, i.e.,
the endowment effect literature Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990).23
In table 1, I calculate the required G for each value of L to make each agent just
indifferent between accepting or rejecting a 50-50 win G or lose L gamble at wealth level
W¯t = 300, 000. It can be seen that the news-utility agent’s risk attitudes take reasonable
values for small, medium, and large stakes.24 In contrast, the standard and long-run
risk agents are risk neutral for small stakes and almost risk neutral for medium stakes.
The habit-formation agent is risk neutral for small stakes, reasonably risk averse for
medium stakes, but that makes him unreasonably risk averse for large stakes. Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) also discuss this finding and indicate that the curvature of the
habit-formation agent’s value function is approximately 80 at the steady-state surplus-
consumption ratio; thus, the habit-formation agent behaves similarly to a standard
agent with θ = 80. The long-run risk agent behaves similarly to a standard agent with
θ = 10, the choice of Bansal and Yaron (2004). Moreover, it can be inferred from this
discussion that the disappointment-aversion model (Routledge and Zin (2010)) does not
23Let me take a concrete example from Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) assuming that utility
over mugs, pens, and small amounts of money is linear. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) hand
out mugs to half the subjects and ask those who did not receive one about their willingness to pay and
those who received one about their willingness to accept when selling the mug. The authors observe
that the median willingness to pay for the mug is $2.75 whereas the willingness to accept is $5.25.
Accordingly, I can infer (1 +η)u(mug) = (1 +ηλ)2.25 and (1 +ηλ)u(mug) = (1 +η)5.25 which implies
that λ ≈ 3 when η ≈ 1. For the pen experiment I also obtain λ ≈ 3. Unfortunately, so far I can
only jointly identify η and λ. If the news-utility agent exhibits only gain-loss utility I would obtain
ηλ2.25 ≈ 5.25 and η2.25 ≈ 2.25, i.e., λ ≈ 2.3 and η ≈ 1 both identified. Alternatively, if I assume that
the market price for mugs (or pens), which is $6 in the experiment (or $3.75), equals (1 + η)u(mug)
(or (1 + η)u(pen)) I can estimate η = 0.74 and λ = 2.03 for the mug experiment and η = 1.09 and
λ = 2.1 for the pen experiment. These latter assumptions are reasonable given the induced-market
experiments of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990). η = 1 and λ ≈ 2.5 thus seem a reasonable
choice and has been typically used in the literature for the static preferences.
24While the news-utility agent’s risk preferences over contemporaneous consumption exactly match
the findings of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990). The news-utility agent’s required gain for
small gambles about future consumption is somewhat lower than the estimates obtained by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) for instance, even though the authors consider monetary gambles and thus future
consumption. But, the news-utility model predicts that people consume entire small gains when being
surprised by risk (Koszegi and Rabin (2009)), thus the contemporaneous consumption results might
be applicable even for monetary gambles. Moreover, a paper which explicitly considers gambles over
future consumption is Andreoni and Sprenger (forthcoming), who find significantly less small-scale risk
aversion towards those gambles. In any case, I do not aim to perfectly match experimental evidence
here; rather, I want to demonstrate that the model does make a significant step forward in explaining
small-stakes risk aversion.
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Table 1: Risk attitudes over small and large wealth bets
standard news-utility habit-formation long-run risk
Loss (L) contemp. prospective
10 10 17 14 10 10
200 200 330 270 200 201
1000 1007 1650 1359 1362 1035
5000 5162 8250 7014 19749 6002
50000 74999 82500 110717 ∞ 303499
100000 299524 165000 6200303 ∞ ∞
For each loss L the table’s entries show the required gain G to make each agent indifferent
between accepting and rejecting a 50-50 gamble win G or lose L at wealth level 300,000.
robustly match risk attitudes towards small and large wealth bets, because the agent
is not necessarily “at the kink”. The asset-pricing theories based on prospect theory
(Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001); Benartzi and Thaler (1995)) imply plausible
attitudes towards small and large wealth bets but not consumption bets and are thus
inconsistent with the endowment-effect evidence.
4.2.2 Calibration and asset-pricing moments
Calibration. Table 3 in appendix A displays the calibration and the resulting mo-
ments of the news-utility and standard models, a short version of which is table 2. I
begin with the model environment and the well-known preference parameters β and θ. I
assume a classical Lucas-tree model in which consumption equals dividends, so that the
model environment is fully calibrated by µc and σc. I follow Bansal and Yaron (2004)
and choose µc = 1.8% and σc = 2.7% in annualized terms. β and θ are then chosen
to roughly match the level of the mean risky return, the mean risk-free return, and
the risky return volatility as done by Bansal and Yaron (2004). Following Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) I simulate the model at a higher
frequency to then annualize moments. The news-utility equity premium increases in
the model’s frequency, which connects to the idea of myopic loss aversion as developed
by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). The news-utility agent dislikes fluctuations in beliefs
about future consumption. Observing the return realization and readjusting consump-
tion plans at higher frequency, i.e., monthly instead of annually, makes the Lucas tree
a less attractive investment opportunity. Therefore, the required compensation for
bearing the risk associated with holdings of the Lucas tree increases.
The simulation frequency thus constitutes a calibrational degree of freedom in the
news-utility model. At a monthly frequency, θ has to be close to one to match the
historical equity premium. To have a bit more scope and aggregate to a quarterly
frequency easily, I chose a one-and-a-half month frequency, θ = 2, and β = 0.98 to
match the historical equity premium as well as its volatility. Simulating the model
at an annual frequency requires a somewhat higher coefficient of risk aversion θ and
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comparably high consumption volatility σc which are, however, not unusual in the
literature. With σc = 3.79%, as in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), and θ = 10, as
in Bansal and Yaron (2004), the annualized news-utility model would roughly match
the historical equity premium and its volatility.
The news-utility parameters are calibrated as standard in the prospect-theory lit-
erature η = 1 and λ ∈ [2; 2.6] to match the large array of experimental evidence on
loss aversion and to induce reasonable risk attitudes over small and large stakes as can
be seen in table 1. These values have also been used in the existing prospect-theory
asset-pricing literature; Benartzi and Thaler (1995) assume a coefficient of loss aversion
λ = 2.5 and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) assume a mean coefficient of loss aver-
sion of approximately 2.25. Moreover, to account for the fact that people are present
biased, I assume that the agent discounts prospective news utility and set γ = 0.8. I
argue that the existing experimental literature suggests fairly tight ranges for all the
news-utility parameters, η, λ, and γ, as well as the standard preference parameters θ
and β. Thus, news utility does not allow for large parameter ranges that can be used
at one’s discretion, as opposed to most preference specifications used in the prospect-
theory asset-pricing literature.25 However, the simulation frequency constitutes a more
worrisome degree of freedom, because it has been ignored in static applications of
Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) preferences.
Risky and risk-free return moments. As can be seen in table 2, the model matches
the historical mean equity premium, its volatility, and the mean risk-free rate elicited
from CRSP return data. Quite remarkably, the news-utility model generates the histor-
ical equity premium volatility, despite that consumption equals dividends in the basic
Lucas-tree model. Thus, the model matches the historical risk-return trade-off with a
Sharpe ratio of approximately 0.35. Unfortunately, the news-utility model completely
mispredicts the risk-free rate volatility. Moreover, the risk-free rate is countercyclical
in the model but procyclical in the data (Fama (1990)).
The model’s performance regarding other return moments is mixed, as can be seen
in table 3. The model matches the contemporaneous correlation of consumption growth
with returns reasonably well but overpredicts the one-period ahead correlation.26 Pre-
dicting too-high correlation between returns and consumption growth is a common fail-
ure of leading asset-pricing models as emphasized by Albuquerque, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2012) among others. But, because the variation in the consumption-wealth
ratio in the news-utility model is a short-run phenomenon, at longer horizons the cor-
relation between consumption growth and asset returns is very low thus matching the
data. In contrast, the variation in the consumption-wealth ratio in the long-run risk
25Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)display results of the parameter k between 3 and 20 and those
of b0 between 0 and 100.
26Many asset-pricing models overstate the contemporaneous correlation of consumption and returns,
which can be reduced by introducing a separate dividend process. As I roughly match this value I
conclude that a separate process for dividends is unnecessary in the basic news-utility model although
it will reduce the mispredicted one-period ahead correlation.
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Table 2: Moments of the basic model
moments standard and news-utility model data
η = 0 λ = 2 λ = 2.3 λ = 2.6
E[rt − rft ] 0.42 3.02 4.31 5.77 6.33
σ(rt − rft ) 2.72 14.7 19.2 23.6 19.4
E[rft ] 5.48 2.15 0.68 -0.92 0.86
σ(rft ) 0.00 12.1 16.6 21.0 0.97
E[ct − pt] -5.35 -5.57 -5.61 -5.69 -3.4
σ(ct − wt) 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.053 0.011
AR(ct − wt) 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.79
R2 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.09
Value-weighted CRSP returns are displayed annualized and in percentage terms. The
quarterly moments for the consumption-wealth ratio and predictability regression
(rt+1 = α+ β(ct − wt) + δrft ) are taken from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) table II and III.
model is a long-run phenomenon and thus implies counterfactually high correlations
between consumption growth and asset returns at longer horizons. Moreover, the auto-
correlation of returns is negative in the model as opposed to around zero in the data.27
Finally, in table 3 I display the moments for a slight increase in θ, γ, and η to give a
quantitative idea of the parameters’ implications.
The consumption-wealth ratio. The model’s simulated consumption-wealth ratio
reflects the prior theoretical results. First, the consumption-wealth ratio is lower than
in the standard model and exhibits variation. As consumption equals dividends in the
classical Lucas-tree model and there is no labor income, the values are difficult to com-
pare with the data. However, the corresponding values in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)
are displayed as an illustration. Both the standard and news-utility model roughly
match the level of the consumption-price ratio, but the standard model mispredicts its
variation whereas the news-utility model’s predicted variation is roughly in line with
the data.28 However, the news-utility consumption-wealth ratio is i.i.d. whereas Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001) find relatively high persistence.
The predictability properties compare quite favorably. The model is able to gener-
ate predictability in quarterly returns yielding R2 values of approximately 10% to 17%.
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) emphasize the medium-run predictive power of the aggre-
gate consumption-wealth ratio. The authors obtain R2 values for quarterly returns of
9% and of 18% for annual excess returns.29 Lustig, Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2012)
27Although, the aggregation to annualized frequency seems to introduce some spurious correlation
as can be seen in the standard model’s moments.
28Moreover, the consumption-wealth ratio cannot be used to forecast consumption growth, which is
in line with the empirical findings in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).
29Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)report small-sample statistics which might be biased up. Therefore,
one might argue that the R2 of the model is somewhat too high, and should be reduced by decreasing
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elaborate on the volatility of the consumption-wealth ratio and the return on the con-
sumption claim. As noted by Hirshleifer and Yu (2011), traditional leading asset-pricing
models have difficulty matching the volatility of the consumption-wealth ratio and the
return on the consumption claim, because they rely on a volatile dividend process, and
the only variation in the consumption-wealth ratio stems from heteroskedasticity in
consumption growth. I can confirm this finding; using the return on the consumption
claim, the R2 in the habit-formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is merely
1.6% and the R2 in the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) is just 2.9%.
Moreover, in figure 3 in appendix A I plot the simulated deviations of the news-
utility, standard, habit-formation, and long-run risk consumption-wealth ratio and com-
pare these with the annual ĉay data provided by Lettau and Ludvigson (2005). For the
habit-formation and long-run risk model I use the calibration of Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) to then aggregate the consumption and wealth time
series. Moreover, I feed in the deviations in log consumption growth ∆c− 12µc of the
ĉay data. As can be seen, news-utility introduces considerably more rapid variation in
the consumption-wealth ratio than the standard model or the model augmented with
long-run risk, but much less variation than the habit-formation model. While, the
long-run risk consumption-wealth ratio appears to be too smooth and habit-formation
consumption-wealth ratio too variable, the news-utility variation in the consumption-
wealth ratio matches the ĉay data quite well. Although it is disputable to compare
the ĉay data to the simulated data of a Lucas-tree model, I conclude that the rapid
variation is supported by the data.30
At first blush, the model’s asset pricing implications appear to be mixed. News util-
ity raises the equity premium and its volatility to historical levels even though I omit
a separate dividend process. Moreover, the variation in substitution motives generates
strong variation in the consumption-wealth ratio and predictability in returns, match-
ing the data better than leading asset-pricing models. However, the model predicts
excessive volatility in the risk-free rate, which I address in the following section.
5 Extensions
Motivation. The news-utility model’s most important shortcoming is the large pre-
dicted variation in the risk-free rate. Nevertheless, I want to take the predictions of
θ, λ, or increasing γ.
30Greenwood and Shleifer (2012) compare a variety of survey data on stock market expectations with
the predicted expected returns of leading asset-pricing models. The authors show that leading asset-
pricing models implied expected returns do not correlate highly with the survey evidence on expected
returns. In particular, the ĉay model of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) fits the survey data better
than the habit-formation and long-run risk models do. I can confirm this finding using the American
Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey and also find that the news-utility model is more
positively correlated with the survey data than the habit-formation, long-run risk, models or the ĉay
data. However, this finding should not be overinterpreted as the annual comparison includes the years
1987 to 2001 only.
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the evidence-based utility specification seriously and believe that people are very un-
willing to substitute consumption intertemporally in some states of the world. The
most important evidence is credit-card borrowing or pay-day loans. However, there
may be forces at work that offset the effects on the aggregate risk-free rate. What
would a consumption process look like which features an almost constant risk-free rate?
An adverse shock to contemporaneous consumption growth has to be associated with
an adverse prediction about future consumption growth to keep the risk-free rate low.
Thus, the model’s risk-free rate process will become more smooth if low values of εt are
associated with a decrease in µc or an increase in σc. Variation in the agent’s expected
consumption growth µc has been exploited by Bansal and Yaron (2004) and termed
long-run risk. Variation in the agent’s expected volatility of consumption growth has
been exploited by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004).31
In section 5.1, I reverse-engineer variation in expected consumption growth and its
volatility to offset the effect of the variation in the agent’s intertemporal smoothing
incentives on the risk-free rate. An adverse shock to consumption growth today is
then associated with low consumption growth but high volatility in the future. There
exists empirical evidence for countercyclical variation in economic uncertainty, or con-
sumption volatility.32 The empirical evidence on excess sensitivity suggests that there
exists positive autocorrelation in consumption growth. However, it turns out that the
variation in the agent’s smoothing incentives require variation in the agent’s expected
consumption growth that is too large to be consistent with aggregate consumption data,
because the variation in consumption volatility appears to be too weak to significantly
affect the strong first-order variation in the agent’s risk-free rate. As another alterna-
tive, I extend the model to account for time-variant disaster risk to smooth out the
risk-free rate in section 5.2. Time-variant disaster risk is a very powerful device under
news-utility preferences because they feature left-skewness aversion: The news-utility
agent hates the left tail and thus disaster risk. It turns out that time-variant disaster
risk is powerful enough to successfully offset the variation in the risk-free rate. More-
over, Barro (2006) provides compelling evidence for the existence of a small probability
of economic disaster.
It is important to note that introducing another source of variation does not elim-
31Campbell and Cochrane (1999) specify heteroskedasticity in consumption growth to make the
risk-free rate exactly constant.
32Since French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) it is well known that volatility of stock returns
fluctuates considerably over time. Moreover, Black (1976) was one of the first to document that stock
returns are negatively correlated with future volatility, an empirical observation which has been referred
to as the leverage or volatility-feedback effect. More recently, Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) document
that the countercyclical and highly volatile Sharpe ratio is not replicated by leading consumption-based
asset pricing models. The Sharpe ratio becomes both more countercyclical and volatile if low returns
imply high expected returns and low volatility, as I assume in the extended model. The authors find
that the consumption-wealth ratio predicts stock market volatility and provide evidence for variation
in aggregate consumption volatility. Furthermore, Tauchen (2011) connects the negative correlation in
stock returns and volatility back to the consumption process underlying a standard Lucas-tree model.
Finally, robust evidence for heteroskedasticity is provided by Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron (2003).
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inate the variation in substitution motives; it merely offsets its effects on the risk-free
rate. Moreover, the extended models feature two sources of variation: The news-utility
variation in substitution motives and heteroskedasticity in consumption growth or time-
variant disaster risk. While the first source of variation concerns intertemporal substi-
tution, the latter work via variation in the price of risk.
5.1 Time-variant consumption growth and volatility
Setup. A decrease in expected consumption growth µc or an increase in expected
volatility σc make the agent consume less and save more. Thus, if an adverse shock
is associated with a decrease in expected consumption growth or an increase in ex-
pected volatility the agent’s intertemporal substitution effects on the risk-free rate will
be partially offset. Let consumption growth be given by log(Ct+1
Ct
) = µt + σtεt+1 with
µt+1 = µc + νµ(µt − µc) + µ˜(εt+1) + ut+1, ut+1 ∼ (0, σ2u), and µ˜(εt+1) = µ¯(log(1−ρt+1ρt+1 )−
E[log(1−ρt
ρt
)]). Moreover, σ2t+1 = σ2c + σ˜(εt+1) + νσ(σ2t − σ2c ) + wt+1, wt ∼ (0, σ2w), and
σ˜(εt) = σ¯(0.5−F (εt)). The variation in σ˜(εt+1) aims to reflect the variation in the ho-
moskedastic consumption-wealth ratio, because heteroskedasticity is intended to offset
the general-equilibrium impact on the risk-free rate. Note that σt is a Markovian pro-
cess, increases in the event of an adverse shock and is characterized by a shape similar to
the consumption-wealth ratio determined by the variation in intertemporal substitution
motives. Moreover, the conditional expectation of economic volatility is characterized
by an AR(1) process with persistence νσ. µt is chosen to fine-tune the remaining vari-
ation in the risk-free rate. The functional form of µ˜(εt) is reverse-engineered such that
if µ¯ = 1 and νµ = 0 the variation in the risk-free rate brought about by the variation in
the price-consumption ratio will be exactly offset, as can be seen in equation (11). If
νµ > 0 the conditional expectation of consumption growth is characterized by an AR(1)
process with persistence νµ. The model’s simple structure is unaffected by variation in
expected consumption growth and derived in appendix C.
Time-variant consumption growth and volatility: Calibration and moments.
I slightly modify the calibration presented in table 3 to roughly match the basic asset-
pricing moments in the modified model which are displayed in table 4 in appendix A. In
particular, I simulate the model at a monthly frequency and decrease β and θ slightly.
For illustration, I chose the simplest possible process for expected consumption growth
with νσ = νµ = 0, σw = σu = 0 and σ¯ = 2. Moreover, I chose µ¯ = 0.8 to smooth out
80% of the variability in the risk-free rate. As can be seen in table 4, the basic asset-
pricing moments are matched well in the model with variation in expected consumption
growth. Importantly, countercyclical variation in consumption growth does not reduce
the variation in the consumption-wealth ratio, such that the model continues to fit
the ĉay data provided by Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) and the model’s predictability
properties are still present. Thus, the variation in expected consumption growth does
not eliminate the variation in intertemporal substitution motives but rather introduces
24
a second channel that offsets the impact on the risk-free rate. If νσ > 0, a positive
shock to economic volatility today implies high volatility in the future because the
heteroskedasticity process is autocorrelated. Then, the size of the excess returns will
be autocorrelated and the model is able to generate autocorrelation in the returns and
long-horizon predictability.33
However, µc, σc, and µ˜(·) jointly determine the moments of the annualized con-
sumption growth process, which I also display in table 4 following Bansal and Yaron
(2004). Unfortunately, the required variation in µ˜(·) significantly changes the moments
of the annualized consumption growth process which then fails to match the data even
if lower levels for both µc and σc are chosen. The annualized standard deviation of
the simulated consumption process should be at most 3.5%. This value is far exceeded
because of the extent of variation in expected consumption growth required to smooth
out 80% of the variability of the risk-free rate.
5.2 Time-variant disaster risk
Setup. An increase in the probability of disaster makes the agent value a unit of
safe consumption more highly. Thus, if adverse shock realizations of the world are
associated with disaster risk the risk-free rate smooths out. Thus, I introduce a small
time-variant probability of disaster according to Barro (2006, 2009). In each period t,
there is a probability pt that a disaster occurs in period t+1 in which case consumption
drops by d percent. Thus, consumption growth is given by log(Ct+1
Ct
) = µc + εt+1 + vt+1
with εt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2c ) and vt+1 = log(1 − d) with probability pt and zero otherwise. I
assume that εt+1 and vt+1 are independent. The simple process governing the variability
in disaster risk is pt+1 = p + ν(pt − p) + ut+1 + g˜(εt+1) with ut+1 ∼ N(0, σ2u) and
g˜(εt) = pp¯(0.5− F (εt)). Note that pt is a Markovian process, increases in the event of
an adverse shock, and is characterized by a similar shape as the consumption-wealth
ratio determined by the variation in intertemporal substitution motives. Moreover,
the conditional expectation of disaster risk is characterized by an AR(1) process with
persistence ν. The model’s simple structure is unaffected by the addition of disaster
risk and derived in appendix D.
The news-utility agent is more affected by the probability of disaster than the stan-
dard agent, because the news-utility agent dislikes disaster risk more. The utility func-
tion’s gain-loss component over news is inspired by prospect theory. Classical prospect
33Koszegi and Rabin (2007) find that news utility causes variation in risk attitudes. In proposition
1, the authors state that the agent becomes less risk averse when moving from a fixed to a stochastic
reference point. With a stochastic reference point, a gamble does not appear as daunting, because some
potential losses were previously expected. Thus, the equity premium in period t depends negatively
on σt−1, because it is determined by the price of risk, i.e.,
Covt(Mt+1,Rt+1)
Et[Mt+1]σt(Rt+1)
, which varies with σt and
σt−1. If high volatility is expected, ρt is less steep and thus less responsive to a shock to consumption
growth, which tends to reduce the required equity premium. Hence, news-utility preferences introduce
two sources of variation in the price of risk and thus the required equity premium: The price of risk
varies with economic volatility σt as in the standard model. Furthermore, for any given σt, the price
of risk varies inversely with the variability of beliefs determined by σt−1.
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theory assumes a value function of the form v(c− r), defined over the actual consump-
tion level c relative to the reference point r. Typically, the value function features a
kink at the reference point r, concavity over gains c > r, convexity over losses c < r, and
probability weighting. In contrast, Koszegi and Rabin (2009) specify gain-loss utility
as the linear difference in utility values µ(u(c) − u(r)) with µ(·) being some type of
prospect-theory value function. The authors note that diminishing sensitivity or prob-
ability weighting may be introduced via µ(·). However, thus far I have followed the
literature and will retain news-utility preferences in their most basic form with µ(·) be-
ing piecewise linear. Interestingly though, using a piecewise linear µ(·) function results
in left-skewness aversion: The news-utility agent hates the left tail. Because the agent
assesses gain-loss utility as the linear difference in utility values u(c) − u(r), the left
tail, where u(·) becomes steep, is relatively overweighted. In classical prospect theory,
left-skewness aversion can only be caused by low-probability overweighting. Thus, the
basic form of Koszegi and Rabin (2009) preferences is likely to yield very interesting
dynamics with respect to a small disaster probability.
Time-variant disaster risk: Calibration and moments. The extended model
yields a realistic set of moments as shown in table 4 in appendix A. The parameters
of disaster risk are calibrated according to Barro (2009) with p = 1.7% and d = 0.29.
Most importantly, the additional variation does not eliminate the variation in intertem-
poral substitution motives or the variation in the consumption-wealth ratio. Rather it
introduces another channel that offsets the impact of varying intertemporal smoothing
incentives on the risk-free rate. A positive autocorrelation in the probability of disaster
ν > 0 will generate long-horizon predictability in returns and excess returns. However,
for simplicity, I again omit persistence and additional noise in the disaster risk process
ν = 0 and σu = 0. The model generates a high equity premium that exhibits consid-
erable variation, although, the model now requires the addition of a separate dividend
process to match historical levels of the equity premium’s variability. The reason is the
low θ I have to choose to not increase the equity premium over and beyond historical
levels. But, the variation in the risk-free rate is successfully reduced to approximately
3%, which is reasonable for international data.
6 Welfare and Beliefs-based Present Bias
Last, I illustrate the model’s welfare implications. In the spirit of Lucas (1978) and Reis
(2009) I show that the news-utility agent would be willing to give up a fraction λW of
consumption in exchange for a risk-free consumption path, i.e., Et[
∑∞
τ=1 β
τu(Ct+τ (1 +
λW ))] =
∑∞
τ=1 β
τu(C¯t+τ ) with C¯t+τ = Et[Ct+τ ] = Cteτµc+τ
1
2
σ2c for all τ . This fraction
determines the costs of business cycle fluctuations and is much higher for the news-
utility agent than the standard agent. For the calibration in table 3 with λ = 2, the
news-utility agent would be willing to give up 17.02% of his consumption in exchange
for a stable consumption path whereas the standard agent would give up merely 3.37%.
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The preferences give rise to a time-inconsistent desire for immediate consumption,
which I call beliefs-based present bias. A simplified intuition is that the agent prefers
to raise consumption above expectations today instead of increasing consumption and
expectations tomorrow. The preferred-personal solution concept requires the agent
to choose an equilibrium path that is credible in the sense that beliefs map into the
correct behavior and vice versa. However, the agent likes to surprise himself with
some extra consumption, taking his beliefs as given in each period. In contrast, on the
optimal pre-committed path that maximizes expected utility the agent jointly chooses
optimal consumption and beliefs. Hence, the time-consistent equilibrium path does not
correspond to the expected-utility maximizing one and the first welfare theorem does
not hold. In appendix E.1 I elaborate on the properties of the optimal pre-committed
path and how beliefs-based present bias differs from hyperbolic discounting.
7 Conclusion
This paper incorporates expectations-based reference-dependent preferences into the
canonical Lucas-tree model. In so doing, I contribute to the prospect-theory asset-
pricing literature, pioneered by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, Huang, and San-
tos (2001), and Yogo (2008), by assuming a generally-applicable utility function that
is based on consumption, does not require a narrow-framing assumption, has a fully
developed reference point, and has been shown to be consistent with behavior in a
variety of micro domains. News utility generates both desirable and undesirable impli-
cations. Most importantly, the preferences shift and introduce strong variation in the
consumption-wealth ratio, which is reflected in an increase and variation in the equity
premium matching historical levels despite the fact that consumption equals dividends.
Intuitively, in bad states of the world, reducing consumption below expectations is
particularly painful and the agent becomes unwilling to substitute present for future
consumption - as is likely to be true for people engaging in too much credit-card bor-
rowing. However, in a general-equilibrium setup, this translates into large variability
in the risk-free rate, a phenomenon not observed in aggregate data. Moreover, I con-
tribute to the asset-pricing literature by making an additional step towards resolving
the equity-premium puzzle. In particular, I show that the agent exhibits plausible risk
attitudes towards small, medium, and large wealth bets simultaneously; this is not the
case for any other preference specification assumed in the literature.
News utility generates a high equity premium, because the agent finds fluctuations
in beliefs about future consumption very painful. This relates to the idea of myopic
loss aversion and strikes me as deeply true in the sense that people may worry too
much about small changes in beliefs about future consumption. Thus, more “newsy”
investments should have higher returns to compensate the painful fluctuations in beliefs.
In the future, I would like to also analyze such cross-sectional stock market phenomena.
27
References
Abel, A. (1990): “Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching up with the
Joneses,” The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 80(2), 38–42.
Abeler, J., A. Falk, L. Goette, and D. Huffman (forthcoming): “Reference
Points and Effort Provision,” American Economic Review, 3939.
Albuquerque, R., M. Eichenbaum, and S. Rebelo (2012): “Valuation Risk and
Asset Pricing,” NBER Working Paper, (18617).
Andreoni, J., and C. Sprenger (forthcoming): “Estimating Time Preferences from
Convex Budgets,” American Economic Review.
Andries, M. (2011): “Consumption-Based Asset Pricing with Loss Aversion,” Working
Paper.
Bansal, R., V. Khatchatrian, and A. Yaron (2003): “Interpretable Asset Mar-
kets?,” Working Paper.
Bansal, R., and A. Yaron (2004): “Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution
of Asset Pricing Puzzles,” Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1481–1509.
Barberis, N., M. Huang, and T. Santos (2001): “Prospect Theory and Asset
Prices,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1).
Barro, R. J. (1999): “Ramsey meets Laibson in the Neoclassical Growth Model,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4).
(2006): “Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 121(3), 823–866.
(2009): “Rare Disasters, Asset Prices, and Welfare Costs,” American Economic
Review, 99(1), 243–264.
Barseghyan, L., F. Molinari, T. O. Donoghue, and J. Teitelbaum (2010):
“The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Data,” Working Paper.
Benartzi, B., and R. Thaler (1995): “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Pre-
mium Puzzle,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 73–92.
Black, F. (1976): “Studies of Stock Price Volatility Changes,” Meetings of the Busi-
ness and Economics Statistics Section, American Statistical Association, pp. 177–181.
Bonomo, M., R. Garcia, N. Meddahi, and R. Tedongap (2011): “Generalized
Disappointment Aversion, Long-Run Volatility Risk and Asset Prices,” Working Pa-
per Toulouse School of Economics.
28
Brunnermeier, M., and S. Nagel (2008): “Do Wealth Fluctuations Generate Time-
Varying Risk Aversion? Micro-Evidence on Individuals’ Asset Allocation,” American
Economic Review, 98(3), 713–736.
Campanale, C., R. Castro, and G. L. Clementi (2010): “Asset Pricing in a
Production Economy with Chew-Dekel Preferences,” Review of Economic Dynamics,
(13), 379–402.
Campbell, J., and J. Cochrane (1999): “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based
Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy,
107(2), 205–251.
Chapman, D. A. (1998): “Habit Formation and Aggregate Consumption,” Economet-
rica, 66(5), 1223–1230.
Chetty, R., and A. Szeidl (2007): “Consumption Commitments and Risk Prefer-
ences,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 831–877.
Crawford, V. P., and J. Meng (2009): “New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply
Revisited: Reference-Dependence Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for
Hours and Income,” University of California at San Diego Department of Economics
Working Paper.
Dybvig, P. H., and J. E. Ingersoll (1989): “Mean-Variance Theory in Complete
Markets,” Journal of Business, 55(2), 233–251.
Eisenhuth, R. (2012): “Reference Dependent Mechanism Design,” Job Market Paper.
Epstein, B., and L. Zin (1989): “Substitution, Risk Aversion and the Temporal
Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework,” Econo-
metrica, 57(4), 937–969.
Ericson, K. M. M., and A. Fuster (2010): “Expectations as Endowments: Evidence
on Reference-Dependent Preferences from Exchange and Valuation Experiments,”
mimeo.
Fama, E. (1990): “Term-Structure Forecasts of Interest Rates, Inflation and Real
Returns,” Journal of Monetary Economics, (25), 59–76.
French, K., G. Schwert, and R. Stambaugh (1987): “Expected Stock Returns
and Volatility,” Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 3–29.
Gill, D., and V. Prowse (2012): “A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion
in a Real Effort Competition,” American Economic Review, 102(1), 469–503.
Greenwood, R., and A. Shleifer (2012): “Expectations of Returns and Expected
Returns,” Working Paper.
29
Heffetz, O., and J. A. List (2011): “Is the Endowment Effect a Reference Effect?,”
NBER Working Paper 16715.
Heidhues, P., and B. Koszegi (2008): “Competition and Price Variation when
Consumers are Loss Averse,” American Economic Review, 98(4), 1245–1268.
(2010): “Regular Prices and Sales,” ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-
10-008.
Herweg, F., and K. Mierendorff (forthcoming): “Uncertain Demand, Consumer
Loss Aversion, and Flat-Rate Tariffs,” Journal of the European Economic Association.
Herweg, F., D. Müller, and P. Weinschenk (2010): “Binary Payment Schemes:
Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion,” American Economic Review, 100(5), 2451–2477.
Hirshleifer, D., and J. Yu (2011): “Asset Pricing in Production Economies with
Extrapolative Expectations,” Working Paper.
Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler (1990): “Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(6),
1325–1348.
(2009): “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theo-
rem,” The New Behavioral Economics, 3, 119–142.
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk,” Econometrica, pp. 263–291.
Karle, H., G. Kirchsteiger, and M. Peitz (2011): “The Impact of Contextual
Reference Dependence on Purchase Decisions: An Experimental Study,” mimeo.
Koszegi, B., and M. Rabin (2006): “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1133–1166.
(2007): “Reference-Dependent Risk Attitiudes,” American Economic Review,
97(4), 1047–1073.
(2009): “Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans,” American Economic Re-
view, 99(3), 909–936.
Laibson, D. (1997): “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112(2), 443–477.
(1998): “Life-cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions,” Euro-
pean Economic Review, 42, 861–871.
30
Laibson, D., A. Repetto, and J. Tobacman (forthcoming): “Estimating Discount
Functions with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle,” American Economic Re-
view.
Lettau, M., and S. Ludvigson (2004): “Measuring and Modeling Variation in the
Risk-Return Trade-off,” Handbook of Financial Econometrics, pp. 617–690.
(2005): “Expected Returns and Expected Dividend Growth,” Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics, (76), 583–626.
Lettau, M., and S. C. Ludvigson (2001): “Consumption, Aggregate Wealth and
Expected Stock Returns,” Journal of Finance, 56(3), 815 – 849.
Lucas, R. E. J. (1978): “Models of Business Cycles,” Basil Blackwell.
(1979): “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy,” Econometrica, 46(6), 1429 –
1445.
Lustig, H., S. V. Nieuwerburgh, and A. Verdelhan (2012): “The wealth-
Consumption Ratio,” Working Paper.
Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott (1985): “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 15(2), 145 – 161.
Meng, J. (2010): “The Disposition Effect and Expectations as Reference Point,”
mimeo.
Pope, D. G., and M. E. Schweitzer (2011): “Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Per-
sistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes,” American
Economic Review, 101, 129–157.
Rabin, M. (2001): “Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theo-
rem,” Econometrica, 68(5), 1281–1292.
Reis, R. (2009): “The Time-Series Properties of Aggregate Consumption: Implica-
tions for the Costs of Fluctuations,” Journal of the European Economic Association,
4(7), 722–753.
Rosato, A. (2012): “Selling Substitute Goods to Loss-Averse Consumers: Limited
Availability, Bargains and Rip-offs,” Job Market Paper.
Routledge, B., and S. Zin (2010): “Generalized Disappointment Aversion and Asset
Prices,” Working Paper.
Sprenger, C. (2010): “An Endowment Effect for Risk: Experimental Tests of Stochas-
tic Reference Points,” Working Paper.
31
Sydnor, J. (2010): “(Over)insuring Modest Risks,” American Economic Journal: Ap-
plied Economics, 2, 177–199.
Tauchen, G. (2011): “Stochastic Volatility in General Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal
of Finance, 1(4), 707–731.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman (1992): “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.
Yogo, M. (2008): “Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Reference-Dependent
Preferences,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 26(2), 131–143.
32
A More figures and tables
Figure 2: Annualized expected risky Et[Rt+1] and risk-free returns Rft+1 in the news-
utility and standard models and annualized equity premium Et[Rt+1] − Rft+1 in the
news-utility and standard models
Figure 3: Simulated consumption-wealth ratio and comparison to the ĉay data as pro-
vided by Lettau and Ludvigson (2005).
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Table 3: Calibration and moments of the basic model
calibration
µc σc β θ η λ γ
1.8% 2.7% .98 2 1 2.3 0.8
moments standard and news-utility model λ = 2 data
η = 0 λ = 2 λ = 2.3 λ = 2.6 θ = 3 γ = 1 η = 1.5
E[rt − rft ] 0.42 3.02 4.31 5.77 4.25 2.66 3.84 6.33
σ(rt − rft ) 2.72 14.7 19.2 23.6 16.9 13.3 17.4 19.42
E[rft ] 5.48 2.15 0.68 -0.92 1.82 2.07 1.23 0.86
σ(rft ) 0.00 12.1 16.6 21.0 14.3 10.6 14.8 0.97
corr(∆ct, rt) 0.71 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.57 0.52 0.36
corr(∆ct, rt+1) 0.55 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.10 -0.04 -0.11 0.09
AR(rt) 0.08 -0.51 -0.54 -0.56 -0.53 -0.48 -0.52 0.011
E[ct − pt] -5.35 -5.57 -5.61 -5.69 -5.31 -5.73 -5.61 -3.4
σ(ct − wt) 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.053 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.011
AR(ct − wt) 1.00 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.79
R2 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.09
Return and consumption moments are inferred from value-weighted CRSP return data and
BEA data on-real per-capita consumption of nondurables and services for the period
1929-1998 (as in Bansal and Yaron (2004)). All return moments are annualized and in
percentage terms. The parameters µc, σc, and β are annualized. The quarterly moments for
the consumption-wealth ratio, the consumption-price ratio, and predictability regression are
taken from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) table II. The R2 corresponds to a forecasting
regression of quarterly stock returns on the quarterly consumption-wealth ratio
rt+1 = α+ β(ct − wt) + δrft (table III in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)).
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Table 4: Calibration and moments of the extended models
calibration variation in µc and σc
µc σc β θ η λ γ νµ µ¯ σ¯
1.8
4
% 2.7√
4
% .94 1.3 1 2.3 0.8 0 0.8 2
calibration disaster risk
µc σc β θ η λ γ ν p¯
1.8% 2.7% .95 1.05 1 2 0.8 0 2
moments extended models data
variation in µc and σc disaster risk
E[rt − rft ] 5.04 6.17 6.33
σ(rt − rft ) 19.6 7.31 19.42
E[rft ] 1.37 1.45 0.86
σ(rft ) 3.72 3.64 0.97
corr(∆ct, rt) 0.75 0.62 0.36
corr(∆ct, rt+1) 0.60 0.06 0.09
AR(rt) 0.18 -0.44 0.011
E[ct − pt] -5.64 -4.91 -3.4
σ(ct − wt) 0.03 0.01 0.011
AR(ct − wt) -0.04 0.04 0.79
R2 0.32 0.05 0.09
E[∆ct+1] 2.25 1.86 1.89
σ(∆ct+1) 13.5 2.24 2.93
Return and consumption moments are inferred from value-weighted CRSP return data and
BEA data on-real per-capita consumption of nondurables and services for the period
1929-1998 (as in Bansal and Yaron (2004)). All return moments are annualized and in
percentage terms. The parameters µc, σc, and β are annualized. The quarterly moments for
the consumption-wealth ratio, the consumption-price ratio, and predictability regression are
taken from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) table II. The R2 corresponds to a forecasting
regression of quarterly stock returns on the quarterly consumption-wealth ratio
rt+1 = α+ β(ct − wt) + δrft (table III in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)).
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B Derivation and proofs
B.1 Proof of proposition 1
In the following, I quickly guess and verify the model’s equilibrium. In section B.2,
I derive the model’s equilibrium in greater detail and more comprehensively. The
exogenous consumption process is Ct+1
Ct
= eµc+εt+1 and, in equilibrium, the agent beliefs
about consumption are fully determined by it, i.e., F tCt+τ = log−N(log(Ct)+τµc, τ 2σ2c ).
First, I define the following two constants determined by the exogenous parameters only
Q = Et[
∞∑
τ=1
βτ (
Ct+τ
Ct
)1−θ] = Et[
∞∑
τ=1
βτ (eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j)1−θ] =
βeµc(1−θ)+
1
2
(1−θ)2σ2c
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c
and
ψ = βeµc(1−θ)Et[(eεt+1)1−θ + (1 + γQ)(η
ˆ εt+1
−∞
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε)+
+ ηλ
ˆ ∞
εt+1
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε)) + (eεt+1)1−θψ)].
The agent’s maximization problem is
maxCt{u(Ct) + n(Ct, F t−1Ct ) + γ
∞∑
τ=1
βτn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) + Et[
∞∑
τ=1
βτUt+τ ]}.
Now, it can be easily noted that Et[
∑∞
τ=1 β
τUt+τ ] = u(Ct)ψ and γ
∑∞
τ=1 β
τn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) =
γ(η
´ Ct
−∞(u(Ct)Q− u(c)Q)dF t−1Ct (c)) + ηλ
´∞
Ct
(u(Ct)Q− u(c)Q)dF t−1Ct (c)) in equilibrium.
The agent is a price-taker. In the beginning of each period, the agent observes the
realization of his wealth Wt and decides how much to consume Ct and how much to
invest into the Lucas tree Pt = Ct −Wt. I guess the model’s solution as Ct = Wtρt
with ρt being i.i.d., independent of calender time t, or wealth Wt. Thus, next period’s
consumption is given by Ct+1 = (Wt−Ct)Rt+1ρt+1 with Rt+1 = Pt+1+Ct+1Pt =
ρt
1−ρt
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
so that Ct+1 = (Wt − Ct) ρt1−ρt
Ct+1
Ct
. From this consideration it can be easily seen that
the agent’s future value u(Ct)ψ and u(Ct)Q can be rewritten as u(Wt − Ct)( ρt1−ρt )1−θψ
and u(Wt − Ct)( ρt1−ρt )1−θQ whereby
ρt
1−ρt stems from the return and is thus taken as
exogenous by the agent. In turn, the maximization problem can be rewritten as
maxCt{u(Ct) + η
ˆ Ct
−∞
(u(Ct)− u(c))dF t−1Ct (c)) + ηλ
ˆ ∞
Ct
(u(Ct)− u(c))dF t−1Ct (c)
+ γQ(η
ˆ Ct
−∞
(u(Wt − Ct)( ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ − u(c))dF t−1Ct (c))
+ ηλ
ˆ ∞
Ct
(u(Wt − Ct)( ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ − u(c))dF t−1Ct (c)) + u(Wt − Ct)(
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θψ}
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which yields the following first-order condition
C−θt (1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))) = (Wt−Ct)−θ(
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ(γQ(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))+ψ)
as the agent takes his prior beliefs about consumption F t−1Ct as given in the optimization
and since F t−1Ct (Ct) = F (εt) with F ∼ N(0, σ2c ), because Ct = Ct−1eµc+εt . Rewriting the
first-order condition allows me to verify the solution guess
Ct
Wt
= ρt =
1
1 + ψ+γQ(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))
1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))
.
B.2 Detailed derivation of the model’s equilibrium
In the following I derive the model’s equilibrium in greater detail. The agent optimally
chooses his consumption Ct to maximize his life-time utility
maxCt{u(Ct) + n(Ct, F t−1Ct ) + γ
∞∑
τ=1
βτn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) + Et[
∞∑
τ=1
βτUt+τ ]}. (14)
The agent’s wealth in the beginning of the period Wt is determined by the portfolio
return Rpt = R
f
t + αt−1(Rt − Rft ), which depends on the risky return realization Rt,
the risk-free return Rft , and last period’s optimal portfolio share αt−1. I impose the
equilibrium condition αt = 1 for all t to simplify the maximization problem. Now the
agent’s problem can be thought of as an infinite-horizon cake-eating problem with a
single risky savings device. Thus, the budget constraint is
Wt = (Wt−1 − Ct−1)Rt (15)
which results in the following first-order condition
u′(Ct)(1 + ηF t−1Ct (Ct) + ηλ(1− F t−1Ct (Ct))) = u′(Wt − Ct)Q0t + u′(Wt − Ct)ψ0t (16)
I explain each term in the first-order condition, equation (16), subsequently. The left
hand side in equation 16 represents the agent’s marginal utility due to consumption
utility and gain-loss utility over contemporaneous consumption. Because the agent takes
the reference point as given in the optimization and assuming optimal consumption is
monotonically increasing in the return realization only the probability masses of states
ahead and beneath remain to be considered. As an illustration, consider the following
optimization
∂
∂Ct
(η
ˆ Ct
−∞
(u(Ct)− u(c)))dF t−1Ct (c)) + ηλ
ˆ ∞
Ct
(u(Ct)− u(c)))dF t−1Ct (c))
= η
ˆ Ct
−∞
u′(Ct)dF t−1Ct (c)+ηλ
ˆ ∞
Ct
u′(Ct)dF t−1Ct (c) = u
′(Ct)(ηF t−1Ct (Ct)+ηλ(1−F t−1Ct (Ct))
= u′(Ct)(ηF t−1Ct (Ct) + ηλ(1− F t−1Ct (Ct))
= u′(Ct)(ηF t−1Rt (Rt) + ηλ(1− F t−1Rt (Rt)) = u′(Ct)(ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt))
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if Ct is monotonically increasing in the realization of Rt then F t−1Rt (Rt) = F
t−1
Ct
(Ct). In a
preferred personal equilibrium the agent would know ex ante if the first-order condition
induces him to “jump” realizations of Rt, and expectations over optimal consumption
would adjust accordingly such that in equilibrium F t−1Ct (Ct) = F
t−1
Rt
(Rt) for each corre-
sponding realization of Ct and Rt. Moreover, in general equilibrium the agent’s beliefs
have to match the model environment and hence F t−1Rt (Rt) = F
t−1
Ct
(Ct) = F (εt) for each
corresponding realization of Ct, Rt, and εt such that both Ct and Rt are necessarily
increasing in εt.
To explain the right hand side in equation 16 I guess and verify the equilibrium’s
structure. In each period t, the agent will consume a fraction ρt of his wealth Wt, i.e.,
Ct = ρtWt. In the first-order condition, equation 16, the first term on the right hand side
represents prospective gain-loss utility over the entire stream of future consumption.
Note that, each future optimal consumption as a fraction of wealth can be iterated back
to the current savings decision
Ct+τ = (Wt − Ct)Rt+τρt+τ
τ−1∏
j=1
Rt+j(1− ρt+j).
Then, taking the reference point as given and assuming that optimal savings are mono-
tonically increasing in the return realization results in
−(Wt−Ct)−θQ0t =
∂
∑∞
τ=1 β
τn(F t,t−1Ct+τ )
∂Ct
=
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
∂
∂Ct
ˆ ∞
−∞
ˆ ∞
−∞
µ(u(c)−u(r))dF t,t−1Ct+τ (c, r)
= −
∞∑
τ=1
βτ (Wt−Ct)−θEt[R1−θt+τ ρ1−θt+τ
τ−1∏
j=1
R1−θt+j (1−ρt+j)1−θ(ηF t−1Rt (Rt)+ηλ(1−F t−1Rt (Rt)))]
= −(Wt−Ct)−θEt[
∞∑
τ=1
βτR1−θt+τ ρ
1−θ
t+τ
τ−1∏
j=1
R1−θt+j (1−ρt+j)1−θ](ηF t−1Rt (Rt)+ηλ(1−F t−1Rt (Rt))).
Moreover,
Rt+1 =
Pt+1 + Ct+1
Pt
=
ρt
1− ρt
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
such that
R1−θt+τ ρ
1−θ
t+τ = (
Ct+τ
Ct+τ−1
ρt+τ−1
1− ρt+τ−1 )
1−θ and R1−θt+j (1−ρt+j)1−θ = (
Ct+j
Ct+j−1
ρt+j−1
1− ρt+j−1
1− ρt+j
ρt+j
)1−θ.
Recall that, the model’s exogenous consumption process implies Ct+τ
Ct
= eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j .
Because in a rational-expectations equilibrium, the agent’s expectational terms have to
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match the model’s specification
∂
∑∞
τ=1 β
τn(F t,t−1Ct+τ )
∂Ct
can be rewritten as −(Wt − Ct)−θQ0t
−(Wt−Ct)−θQ0t = −(Wt−Ct)−θ(
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θγ
βeµc(1−θ)+
1
2
(1−θ)2σ2c
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Q
(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))
= −(Wt − Ct)−θ( ρt
1− ρt )
1−θγQ(ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt))).
Returning to equation 16, the second term on the right hand side −(Wt − Ct)−θψ0t
refers to next period’s marginal value, which turns out to be linear in the marginal
utility of wealth. As above, iterating back next period’s marginal utility, i.e., ∂u(Ct+1)
∂Ct
=
(Wt − Ct)−θR1−θt+1ρ1−θt+1 and similarly for future consumption, for instance ∂u(Ct+2)∂Ct =
(Wt − Ct)−θR1−θt+1 (1− ρ1−θt+1 )R1−θt+2ρ1−θt+2 , yields
(Wt−Ct)−θβEt[R1−θt+1 Ψt+1] = (Wt−Ct)−θβEt[R1−θt+1ρ1−θt+1 +η
ˆ Rt+1ρt+1
−∞
(R1−θt+1ρ
1−θ
t+1−(Rρ)1−θ)dFRρ(Rρ)+
+ ηλ
ˆ ∞
Rt+1ρt+1
(R1−θt+1ρ
1−θ
t+1 − (Rρ)1−θ)ddFRρ(Rρ)+
+γ(
ρt+1
1− ρt+1 )
1−θQ(η
ˆ Rt+1(1−ρt+1)
−∞
(R1−θt+1 (1−ρt+1)1−θ−(R(1−ρ))1−θ)dFR(1−ρ)(R(1−ρ))+
+ηλ
ˆ ∞
Rt+1(1−ρt+1)
(R1−θt+1 (1−ρt+1)1−θ−(R(1−ρ))1−θ)dFR(1−ρ)(R(1−ρ))+βR1−θt+1 (1−ρ1−θt+1 )Et+1[R1−θt+2 Ψt+2]].
Now, let ψ = βEt[(Ct+1Ct
1
ρt+1
)1−θΨt+1] = βEt+1[(
Ct+2
Ct+1
1
ρt+2
)1−θΨt+2] which is constant
for any period t because Ct+1
Ct
, ρt+1, and Ψt+1 are all solely determined by the real-
ization of εt+1 and exogenous parameters. Then, the last term in the equation of
(Wt − Ct)−θβEt[R1−θt+1 Ψt+1] is
βR1−θt+1 (1− ρ1−θt+1 )Et+1[R1−θt+2 Ψt+2] = R1−θt+1 (1− ρ1−θt+1 )(
ρt+1
1− ρt+1 )
1−θψ = R1−θt+1ρ
1−θ
t+1ψ.
And, moreover
βEt[R
1−θ
t+1 Ψt+1] = βEt[(
Ct+1
Ct
ρt
1− ρt
1
ρt+1
)1−θΨt+1] = (
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θψ
such that it follows for the first-order condition, equation 16, that ψ0t = (
ρt
1−ρt )
1−θψ.
Plugging in Rt+1 = Ct+1Ct
ρt
1−ρt
1
ρt+1
in the equation for Et[R1−θt+1 Ψt+1] and recalling that
Ct+1
Ct
= eµc+εt+1 or alternatively simply dividing next period’s Ct+1 terms by Ct allows
to express ψ in much simpler terms
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(
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θψ = (
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θβeµc(1−θ)Et[(eεt+1)1−θ+(1+γQ)(η
ˆ εt+1
−∞
((eεt+1)1−θ−(eε)1−θ)dF (ε)+
+ ηλ
ˆ ∞
εt+1
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε)) + (eεt+1)1−θψ)]
accordingly ψ = Q+ (1 + γQ)Ω = Q+ Ω + γΩQ with Ωgiven by
Ω =
βeµc(1−θ)Et[(η
´ εt+1
−∞ ((e
εt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε) + ηλ ´∞
εt+1
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε))]
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c
Ω =
βeµc(1−θ)ω(σc)
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c with
ω(σ) =
ˆ ∞
−∞
(η
ˆ z
−∞
((ez)1−θ−(eε)1−θ)dF (ε)+ηλ
ˆ ∞
z
((ez)1−θ−(eε)1−θ)dF (ε))dF (z) z, ε ∼ N(0, σ2)
=
ˆ ∞
−∞
{ηF (z)e(1−θ)z − ηe 12 (1−θ)2σ2(1− F ((1− θ)σ
2 − z
σ
))
+ ηλ(1− F (z))e(1−θ)z − ηλe 12 (1−θ)2σ2F ((1− θ)σ
2 − z
σ
)}dF (z)
In turn, the first-order condition can be rewritten as
u′(Ct)(1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))) = u′(Wt−Ct)( ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ(γQ(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))+ψ).
And the general equilibrium consumption-wealth ratio is then given by
Ct
Wt
= ρt =
1
1 + Q+Ω+γQΩ+γQ(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))
1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))
.
Now, the solution guess Ct = ρtWt and Wt − Ct = (1 − ρt)Wt can be verified. The
agent’s value function is given by Vt(Wt) = u(Wt)Ψt. Obviously, Ct, Wt − Ct, and Rt
are all increasing in the realization of εt. Finally, note that solving the model using
backward induction and taking it to its limit yields this exact same solution.
The stochastic discount factor can be inferred from the first-order condition
1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1] = Et[
βu′(Wt+1)Ψt+1
u′(Ct)(1 + ηF (Rt) + ηλ(1− F (Rt)))− Et[u′(Wt − Ct)Qt]Rt+1]
⇒Mt+1 = (1+(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))(1− ρt
1− ρtγQ))
−1(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)−1β(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)1−θΨt+1
= (
ρt
1− ρtψ)
−1(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)−1β(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)1−θΨt+1
β(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)1−θΨt+1 = βeµc(1−θ){(eεt+1)1−θ+(1+γQ)(η
ˆ εt+1
−∞
((eεt+1)1−θ−(eε)1−θ)dF (ε)+
+ ηλ
ˆ ∞
εt+1
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε)) + (eεt+1)1−θψ}
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If η(λ − 1) > 1, the stochastic discount factor in the news utility model has a
somewhat irritating feature: The existence of gain-loss utility generates negative values
of the stochastic discount factor in particularly good states of the world. For any
parameter choice, increasing the realization of εt+1 will result in negative values ofMt+1
at some point. The agent dislikes it if a return pays out in particularly good states of
the world because he will experience adverse news-utility in all other states. Therefore,
ex ante, the agent would prefer to burn consumption in those particularly pleasurable
states. Although a negative stochastic discount factor implies arbitrage opportunities,
non-satiated agents would not choose to buy consumption in these states at negative
prices because they would experience adverse news utility in all other states. Therefore,
the equilibrium is still valid. Moreover, the negativity of the stochastic discount factor
in these states is unlikely to matter for the model’s implications because, for reasonable
parameter combinations, negativity only occurs in the range of four to five standard
deviations from the mean. This positive probability of negative state prices is not
new to the literature, Chapman (1998) elaborates on the possibility arising in habit-
formation endowment economies and Dybvig and Ingersoll (1989) show how it arises in
the CAPM.
Note that, for η = 0 the model reduces to non-news or plain power utility in which
the consumption-wealth ratio ρs is constant:
(
ρs
1− ρs )
1−θψ = βEt[R1−θt+1 Ψt+1]⇒ ψ = βeµc(1−θ)Et[(eεt+1)1−θ + (eεt+1)1−θψ]⇒ ψ = Q
1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1] = Et[
βu′(Wt+1)((ρs)1−θ + (1− ρs)( ρs1−ρs )1−θψ)
u′(Ct)
Rt+1]
Mt+1 = β(
1
ρs
Ct+1
Ct
)−θ(ρs)1−θ(1 + ψ) = β(
Ct+1
Ct
)−θ
B.3 Proof of proposition 2
The marginal value of savings is given by −dβEt[u(Wt+1)Q0t+1]
dCt
= u′(Wt−Ct)(Q+Ω+γΩQ)
whereas in the standard model η = 0 ⇒ Ω = 0 and the marginal value of savings is
given by u′(Wt−Ct)Q. If η > 0, λ > 1 and θ > 1 then Ω > 0 such that Q+Ω+γΩQ > Q
because:
Ω =
βeµc(1−θ)ω(σc)
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c with ω(σc) > 0 for θ > 1
since ω(σ) =
ˆ ∞
−∞
(η
ˆ z
−∞
((ez)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 for θ>1
dF (ε)+ ηλ︸︷︷︸
>η
ˆ ∞
z
((ez)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for θ>1
dF (ε))dF (z)
Therefore, news-utility introduces an additional precautionary savings motive. More-
over, the consumption-wealth ratio is given by
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ρt =
1
1 + Q+Ω+γQΩ+γQ(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))
1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))
whereas in the standard model ρ =
1
1 +Q
.
Thus, the consumption-wealth ratio is unambiguously lower than in the standard model
for γ = 1 because
Q+Ω+γQΩ
Q
+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))
1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)) > 1. For γ < 1, the consumption-wealth
ratio is lower if γ > γ¯ with
Q+ Ω + γ¯QΩ + γ¯Q(ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt)))
1 + ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt)) = Q⇒ γ¯ =
ηλ− Ω
Q
Ω + ηλ
.
As can be easily seen, γ¯ < 1. I chose F (εt) = 1 to obtain γ¯ because F (εt) = 1 maximizes
ρt if θ > 1. Moreover, as can be easily seen ∂Ω∂η ,
∂Ω
∂λ
> 0 if θ > 1. Then
∂γ¯
∂η
=
∂
ηλ−Ω
Q
Ω+ηλ
∂η
=
(λ− 1
Q
∂Ω
∂η
)(Ω + ηλ)− (∂Ω
∂η
+ λ)(ηλ− Ω
Q
)
(Ω + ηλ)2
≤ 0 if Ω ≤ ∂Ω
∂η
η,
∂γ¯
∂λ
=
∂
ηλ−Ω
Q
Ω+ηλ
∂λ
=
(η − 1
Q
∂Ω
∂λ
)(Ω + ηλ)− (∂Ω
∂λ
+ η)(ηλ− Ω
Q
)
(Ω + ηλ)2
< 0 if Ω <
∂Ω
∂λ
λ.
Additionally, by looking at Ω it is clear that ∂Ω
∂η
= Ω
η
and ∂Ω
∂λ
λ > Ω if θ > 1 so that the
two conditions always hold.
If θ > 0 then Ω > 0 and ∂Ω
∂η
> 0 and ∂Ω
∂λ
> 0 such that ∂ρt
∂η
< 0 and ∂ρt
∂λ
< 0 for
any εt. As ∂ρt∂εt < 0 and if
η−Ω
Q
Ω+η
< γ < γ¯, such that ρs and ρt cross at some point
εt = ε¯t determined by ρt = ρs, then it can be easily inferred that ε¯t is decreasing in the
news-utility parameters ∂ε¯t
∂λ
, ∂ε¯t
∂η
≤ 0.
B.4 Proof of proposition 3
The slope of the consumption-wealth ratio is given by
∂ρt
∂εt
= −ρ2t
(Q+ Ω + γQΩ− γQ)ηf(εt)(λ− 1)
(1 + ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt)))2 .
Accordingly, ∂ρt
∂εt
6= 0 iff λ > 1 and Q + Ω + γΩQ 6= γQ, additionally, ∂ρt
∂εt
< 0 iff λ > 1
and Q + Ω + γΩQ > γQ which is necessarily true for θ > 1 or for θ < 1 if γ < γ˜ with
γ˜ = Q+Ω
Q(1−Ω) . Furthermore, if θ = 1 and γ = 1 then
∂ρt
∂εt
= 0. If θ < 1 and γ > γ˜ then
∂ρt
∂εt
> 0.
B.5 Proof of proposition 4
The news-utility equity premium
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Et[Rt+1]−Rft+1 =
ρt
1− ρt (Et[
1
ρt+1
Ct+1
Ct
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
−ψEt[β(Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)−θΨt+1]−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
).
Clearly, Et[Rt+1], Rft+1, and Et[Rt+1]− Rft vary with ρt1−ρt whereas the other terms are
constant in an i.i.d. world. As
∂
ρt
1−ρt
∂εt
< 0 for η > 0, λ > 1, and θ > 1 so are ∂Et[Rt+1]
∂εt
< 0,
∂Rft
∂εt
< 0, and ∂Et[Rt+1]−R
f
t
∂εt
< 0.
B.6 Risk attitudes towards wealth bets
Recall that βEt[Vt+1(Wt+1)] = Et[
∑∞
τ=1 β
τUt+τ ] = u(Ct)ψ and γ
∑∞
τ=1 β
τn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) =
γ(η
´ Ct
−∞(u(Ct)Q − u(c)Q)dF t−1Ct (c)) + ηλ
´∞
Ct
(u(Ct)Q − u(c)Q)dF t−1Ct (c)) such that the
news-utility agent will accept the gamble iff
γ(0.5η(u((Wt +G)ρt)Q− u((Wt)ρt)Q) + ηλ0.5(u((Wt − L)ρt)Q− u((Wt)ρt)Q)
+ 0.5u((Wt +G)ρt)ψ + 0.5u((Wt − L)ρt)ψ > u(Wtρt)ψ
⇒ γ(0.5η(u(Wt +G)− u(Wt)) + ηλ0.5(u(Wt − L)− u(Wt)))Q
Q+ Ω + γQΩ
+0.5u(Wt+G)+0.5u(Wt−L) > u(Wt)
whereas the standard agent will accept the gamble iff
0.5u((Wt+G)ρ
s)Q+0.5u((Wt−L)ρs)Q > u(Wtρs)Q⇒ 0.5u(Wt+G)+0.5u(Wt−L) > u(Wt).
C Variation in consumption growth
The model’s simple structure is unaffected, Ct = ρtWt and Vt(Wt) = u(Wt)Ψt with ρt
given by
ρt =
1
1 + ψt+γQt(ηFt−1(εt)+ηλ(1−Ft−1(εt)))
1+ηFt−1(εt)+ηλ(1−Ft−1(εt))
.
Fluctuations in beliefs about economic volatility make the exogenous parameters ψt =
fψ(µt, σt) and Qt = fQ(µt, σt) variant, and the calculation of ψt and Qt thus becomes
somewhat more complicated, by the same argument as above
Qt = Et[β(e
µt+σtεt+1)1−θ]+Et[β(eµt+σtεt+1)1−θQt+1] = e(1−θ)µt(Et[β(eσtεt+1)1−θ]+Et[β(eσtεt+1)1−θQt+1]).
And ψt is
ψt = βEt[(e
µt+σtεt+1)1−θ + η(λ− 1)
ˆ εt+1
−∞
((eµt+σtεt+1)1−θ − (eµt+σtx)1−θ)dF (x)+
+η(λ−1)
ˆ εt+1
−∞
((eµt+σtεt+1)1−θQt+1−(eµt+σtx)1−θfQ(µ˜(µt, x), σ˜(σt, x)))dF (x)+β(eµt+σtεt+1)1−θψt+1].
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Note that in the standard model ρt = 11+ψst with
ψst = f
ψs(µt, σt) = βEt[(e
µt+σtεt+1)1−θ] + βEt[(eµt+σtεt+1)(1−θ)ψst+1]
Unfortunately, the heteroskedasticity model can no longer be solved analytically. But,
thanks to the geometric-sum nature of Qt and ψt they can be computed numerically
using a simple interpolation procedure that iterates until convergence. The numerical
solution procedure appears to be very robust and pricing errors in 1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1]
are very small.
D Disaster risk
The model’s simple structure is unaffected by disaster risk in the consumption process,
Ct = ρtWt and Vt(Wt) = u(Wt)Ψt, but ρt now depends on the probability of disaster pt
and if disaster happened vt and is given by
ρt =
1
1 + ψt+γQt(ηFt−1(εt,vt)+ηλ(1−Ft−1(εt,vt)))
1+ηFt−1(εt,vt)+ηλ(1−Ft−1(εt,vt))
.
Note that Ft−1(εt, 0) = pt−1F (εt−log(1−d))+(1−pt−1)F (εt) if a disaster does not occur
with probability 1−pt−1 and Ft−1(εt, log(1−d)) = pt−1F (εt)+(1−pt−1)F (εt+log(1−d))
if a disaster occurs with probability pt−1.
If disaster risk is invariant, Q and ψ are constant, from the same arguments as above
Q = Et[
∞∑
τ=1
βτ (eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+τ+
∑τ
j=1 vt+τ )1−θ]
with Et[e(1−θ)
∑τ
j=1 vt+j ] = Et[e
(1−θ)vt+1 ]τ = (1− p+ p(1− d)1−θ)τ
such that Q =
βeµc(1−θ)+
1
2
(1−θ)2σ2c (1− p+ p(1− d)1−θ)
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c (1− p+ p(1− d)1−θ)
ψ = Q+ Ω + γQΩ and Ω =
βeµc(1−θ)((1− p)ω(p) + pωp(p))
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c (1− p+ p(1− d)1−θ) with
ω(p) =
ˆ ∞
−∞
η(λ−1)
ˆ ∞
z
(1−p)((ez)1−θ−(eε)1−θ)+p((ez)1−θ−(eε(1−d))1−θ)dF (ε)dF (z)
ωp(p) =
ˆ ∞
−∞
+η(λ−1)
ˆ ∞
ez(1−d)
(1−p)((ez(1−d))1−θ−(eε)1−θ)+p((ez(1−d))1−θ−(eε(1−d))1−θ)dF (z)
For time-variation in disaster risk, vt+1 ∼ (pt, d), Qt = fQ(pt) and ψt = fψ(pt) become
variant with pt
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Qt = βEt[(e
µc+σcεt+1+vt+1)1−θ]+βEt[(eµc+σcεt+1+vt+1)1−θQt+1] = Et[
∞∑
τ=1
βτ (eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j+
∑τ
j=1 vt+τ )1−θ]
= β(1− pt + pt(1− d)1−θ)(Et[(eµc+σcεt+1)1−θ] + Et[(eµc+σcεt+1)1−θQt+1])
ψt = βe
(1−θ)µcEt[{(1− pt)(eσtεt+1)1−θ + pt(eσtεt+1(1− d))1−θ
+(1−pt)η(λ−1)
ˆ ∞
εt+1
((1−pt)((eσtεt+1)1−θ−(eσtx)1−θ)+pt((eσtεt+1)1−θ−(eσtx(1−d))1−θ))dF (x)
+ptη(λ−1)
ˆ ∞
log(eεt+1 (1−d))
((1−pt)((eσtεt+1(1−d))1−θ−(eσtx)1−θ)+pt((eσtεt+1(1−d))1−θ−(eσtx(1−d))1−θ))dF (x)
+γ(1−pt)η(λ−1)
ˆ ∞
εt+1
(1−pt)((eσcεt+1)1−θQt+1−(eσcx)1−θfQ(p˜(x, pt)))+pt((eσcεt+1)1−θQt+1
−(eσcx(1−d))1−θfQ(p˜(x, pt)))dF (x)+γptη(λ−1)
ˆ ∞
eσtεt+1 (1−d)
((1−pt)((eσtεt+1(1−d))1−θQt+1−(eσtx)1−θ
fQ(p˜(x, pt)))+pt((e
σtεt+1(1−d))1−θQt+1−(eσtx(1−d))1−θ)fQ(p˜(x, pt)))dF (x)+(1−pt+pt(1−d)1−θ)e(1−θ)σcεt+1ψt+1}]
E Online Appendix
E.1 Beliefs-based present-bias
As can be seen in the first-order condition 8, the news discounting parameter γ is
unambiguously positively related to the consumption-wealth ratio. For lower values of
the news discounting parameter, the agent consumes more of his wealth because positive
news about the present is overweighted. Therefore, the model induces overconsumption
if the agent discounts news about future consumption. But, the preferences feature
a more conceptual desire for time-inconsistent overconsumption. In equilibrium, the
agent takes his beliefs as given and optimizes over consumption. In contrast, on some
optimal pre-committed path the agent jointly optimizes over consumption and beliefs.
The following proposition summarizes how the pre-committed consumption path differs
from the time-consistent one.
Proposition 5. If there is uncertainty σc > 0, and θ 6= 1 then the expected-utility-
maximizing consumption path does not correspond to the Markovian rational-expectations
equilibrium consumption path. In particular, for θ > 1 the agent chooses a suboptimal
overconsumption equilibrium path. The pre-committed consumption-wealth ratio is gen-
erally lower and the gap increases in good states:
ρt < ρ
c
t and
∂(ρt − ρct)
∂εt
> 0
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Proof of proposition 5 The optimal pre-committed and non-pre-committed consumption-
wealth ratios are given by
ρct =
1
1 + Q+Ω+γQΩ+γQη(λ−1)(1−2F (εt)))
1+η(λ−1)(1−2F (εt))
and ρt =
1
1 + Q+Ω+γQΩ+γQ(ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))
1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt))
.
For σc = 0 if γ > 1λ then ρ
c
t = ρt, if γ <
1
λ
then ρct < ρt.
For σc > 0, ρct < ρt iff θ > 1 as η(λ− 1)(1− 2F (εt))) < ηF (εt) + ηλ(1− F (εt)) for
all εt ∼ N(0, σ2c ) and Q+ Ω + γΩQ > γQ. Moreover, ρt− ρct is increasing in εt because
η(1− F (εt)) + ηλF (εt) is increasing in εt, i.e., ∂(ρt−ρ
c
t )
∂εt
> 0. 
Suppose the agent can pre-commit to an optimal history-dependent consumption
path for each possible future contingency. When choosing the optimal pre-committed
consumption in each state, the marginal gain-loss utility is no longer solely composed
of the sensation of increasing consumption in that state u′(Ct)(ηF t−1Ct (Ct) + ηλ(1 −
F t−1Ct (Ct))). Additionally, the agent considers that in all other states of the world he
experiences fewer feelings of gain and more feelings of loss due to increasing consumption
in that contingency −u′(Ct)(η(1− F t−1Ct (Ct)) + ηλF t−1Ct (Ct)). Marginal gain-loss utility
is then given by η(λ − 1)(1 − 2F (εt)) ∈ [−η(λ − 1), η(λ − 1)]. Let me illustrate this
derivation in greater depth.
Suppose the agent has the ability to pick an optimal history-dependent consumption
path for each possible future contingency in period zero when he does not experience
any gain-loss utility. The maximization problem can be represented in recursive format
as above
max{u(Ct) + n(Ct, F t−1Ct ) + γ
∞∑
τ=1
βτn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) + βV (Wt+1)}
The crucial difference is that in period zero the agent chooses optimal consumption in
period t in each possible contingency jointly with his beliefs, which of course coincide
with the agent’s optimal state-contingent plan. For instance, consider the joint opti-
mization over consumption and beliefs for C(W ∗) when wealth W ∗ has been realized:
∂
∂C(W ∗)
{
ˆ ˆ
µ(u(C(W ))− u(C(W ′)))dF (W ′)dF (W )}
=
∂
∂C(W ∗)
ˆ
η
ˆ W
−∞
{(u(C(W ))−u(C(W ′)))dF (W ′)+ηλ
ˆ ∞
W
(u(C(W ))−u(C(W ′)))dF (W ′)}dF (W )
= u′(C(W ∗))(ηF (W ∗) + ηλ(1− F (W ∗)))− u′(C(W ∗))(η(1− F (W ∗)) + ηλF (W ∗))
= u′(C(W ∗))η(λ− 1)(1− 2F (W ∗)) with η(λ− 1)(1− 2F (W ∗)) > 0 for F (W ∗) < 0.5
Consider the difference from the term in the initial first-order condition u′(Ct)(ηF (εt)+
ηλ(1−F (εt)): When choosing the pre-committed plan, the additional utility of increas-
ing consumption a little bit is no longer only composed of the additional step in the
probability distribution. Instead, the two additional negative terms account for the
fact that in all other states of the world, the agent experiences less feelings of gain and
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more feelings of loss due to increasing consumption in that contingency. The equation
indicates that the marginal utility of state W ∗ will be increased by news utility if the
realization is below the median. For realizations above the median, marginal utility
will be decreased and the agent will consume relatively less. In general equilibrium,
again the agent’s expectational terms have to match the model’s setup and the above
expression becomes:
= C−θt (1 + η(λ− 1)(1− 2F (εt))) with η(λ− 1)(1− 2F (εt)) ∈ [−η(λ− 1), η(λ− 1)]
Accordingly, by the same reasoning as above the first-order condition for the pre-
committed consumption path is given by:
C−θt (1 + η(λ− 1)(1− 2F (εt))) = (Wt−Ct)−θ(
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ(γQη(λ− 1)(1− 2F (εt)) +ψ)
ρct =
1
1 + ψ+γQη(λ−1)(1−2F (εt)))
1+η(λ−1)(1−2F (εt))
and
∂ρct
∂εt
= −(ρct)2
(ψ − γQ)η(λ− 1)2f(εt)
(1 + η(λ− 1)(1− 2F (εt)))2
Not surprisingly, the agent’s first-order condition has only changed with respect to
present gain-loss utility over current and future consumption. In the non-pre-committed
optimization, the agent took the beliefs he had as given, now he considers the true costs
of increasing consumption on his gain-loss feelings in all other states of the world.34
Marginal pre-committed gain-loss utility is generally lower and thus the pre-committed
agent consumes less in all states. Moreover, pre-committed marginal utility will only be
increased by news utility if the realization is below the median. For realizations above
the median marginal utility will be decreased. In contrast, on the non-pre-committed
path ηF t−1Ct (Ct)+ηλ(1−F t−1Ct (Ct)) ∈ [η, ηλ] and marginal gain-loss utility is always pos-
itive, as the agent enjoys the sensation of increasing consumption in any state. Thus,
in good states, the conceptual problem of beliefs-based present bias is more powerful:
Pre-committed marginal gain-loss utility is negative, which never happens on the non-
pre-committed path. Therefore, the degree of present bias is reference-dependent and
increasing in good states.35
34Unfortunately, there is a problem that arises in the pre-commitment optimization problem that
was absent in the non-pre-committed one: When beliefs are taken as given, the agent optimizes over
two concave functions, consumption utility and the first part of gain-loss utility. Accordingly, the first-
order condition specifies a maximum. In contrast, when the agent simultaneously chooses his beliefs
and his consumption, he also optimizes over the second, convex part of gain-loss utility. The additional
part determining marginal utility −u′(Ct)(η(1−F (εt))+ηλF (εt)) is largest in particularly good states
of the world, as increasing consumption in these states implies additional feelings of loss in almost all
other states of the world. It can be easily shown that the sufficient condition for the optimization
problem holds if the parameters satisfy the following simple condition: η(λ − 1)(2F (εt) − 1) < 1.
Accordingly, for η(λ−1) > 1, which is true for a range of commonly used parameter combinations, the
first-order condition no longer specifies the optimum for favorable states F (εt) = 1. For the purposes of
this paper, the pre-commitment case was merely meant to illustrate the agent’s present bias. Hence, at
this point, I am not going to pursue the issue of convexity in the pre-committed optimization further.
35The news-utility induced beliefs-based present-bias is not only conceptually very different from
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E.2 Prospective gain-loss using the ordered comparison
Koszegi and Rabin (2009) assume that the decision-maker experiences prospective gain-
loss utility by means of an ordered comparison of her prior and updated beliefs about
the stream of future consumption. The ordered comparison is slightly different from the
static comparison assumed in Koszegi and Rabin (2009). Rigorously applying the static
comparison to prospective gain-loss utility would imply that the agent experiences gain-
loss utility over risk, which has been priorly expected, but not resolved. I circumvent
this problem by excluding future uncertainty from the static comparison. This captures
a similar intuition but is not exactly the same as the ordered comparison. In the
following, I outline the model solution under the assumptions of the ordered comparison.
Prospective gain-loss about consumption in each future period Ct+τ is then given by:
∞∑
τ=1
βτN(F tCt+τ , F
t−1
Ct+τ
) =
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
ˆ ∞
−∞
µ(u(CF tCt+τ
(p))− u(CF t−1Ct+τ (p)))dp
As above Ct+τ can be expressed as:
Ct+τ = Cte
τµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j = (Wt−1 − Ct−1)Rtρteτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j
= (Wt−1−Ct−1) ρt−1
1− ρt−1
Ct
Ct−1
eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j = (Wt−1−Ct−1) ρt−1
1− ρt−1 e
(τ+1)µc+
∑τ
j=0 εt+j
Thus, I can write
∂
∑∞
τ=1 β
τn(F tCt+τ , F
t−1
Ct+τ
)
∂Ct
=
= −(Wt−Ct)−θ( ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
ˆ ∞
−∞
(eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j(p))1−θµI(u(CF tCt+τ (p))−u(CF t−1Ct+τ (p)))dp
with µI(x) = η if x ≥ 0 andµI(x) = ηλ if x < 0. Moreover, the sum of expected
consumption and gain-loss utility, ψ, looks slightly different. Recall, the agent’s value
βδ−preferences, but as well observationally distinguishable. In the Lucas-tree model βδ−preferences,
with a hyperbolic-discounting factor denoted by b < 1, would merely lead to an upward shift of the
consumption-wealth ratio ρb = 11+bQ whereas in the standard model ρ
s = 11+Q and the βδ−agent
would like to pre-commit to the standard agent’s path. Thus, there are three main differences between
βδ−preferences and news utility: First, news utility introduces an additional precautionary savings
effect which is absent in the βδ−model. Rather, uncertainty increases the future marginal propensity
to consume, which increases the effective discount rate, so that the agent tends to consume more
(Laibson (1998)). Secondly, the optimal pre-committed consumption path is time-variant. In contrast
to βδ−preferences, the agent does not have a universal desire to pre-commit himself and consume at
his liquidity constraint each period (Laibson (1997)). With illiquid and liquid savings the news-utility
agent would trade-off the benefits of smoothing consumption and news utility with his present-bias.
Last but not least, news-utility preferences predict a state-dependent b, the agent’s degree of present-
bias varies. In particular, the agent is better behaved in bad times. In my opinion βδ−preferences
could be a reduced form of a more fundamental source of present-bias as introduced by news utility
for instance.
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Vt+1(Wt+1) = u(Wt+1)Ψt+1:
βEt[Vt+1] = βEt[u(Wt+1)Ψ
OC
t+1] = u(Wt−Ct)βEt[R1−θt+1 ΨOCt+1] = u(Wt−Ct)(
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θψ
= u(Wt − Ct)( ρt
1− ρt )
1−θβeµc(1−θ)Et[(eεt+1)1−θ + (η
ˆ εt+1
−∞
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε)+
+ ηλ
ˆ ∞
εt+1
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε))]+
γβ(((Wt − Ct) ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ)−1
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
ˆ ∞
−∞
µ(u(CF tCt+τ
(p))− u(CF t−1Ct+τ (p)))dp
+ (
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θβeµc(1−θ)Et[(eεt+1)1−θψ)]
since Ct+τ = (Wt − Ct) ρt
1− ρt e
τµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+τ with (Wt − Ct) ρt
1− ρt known in period t
accordingly ψ = Q+ Ω + γΩOC with ΩOCgiven by
ΩOC =
β
∑∞
τ=1 β
τ
´∞
−∞
´∞
−∞ µ((e
τµc+εt+1+
∑τ
j=2 εt+j(p))1−θ − (eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j(p))1−θ)dpdF (εt+1)
1− βeµc(1−θ)+ 12 (1−θ)2σ2c
The stochastic discount factor is then given by:
1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1] = Et[
βu′(Wt+1)ΨOCt+1
u′(Ct)(1 + ηF (Rt) + ηλ(1− F (Rt)))− u′(Wt − Ct)QOCt
Rt+1]
QOCt = γ(
ρt
1− ρt )
1−θ
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
ˆ ∞
−∞
(eτµc+
∑τ
j=1 εF (p))1−θµI(u(CF tCt+τ (p))− u(CF t−1Ct+τ (p)))dp
⇒Mt+1 = ((1+ηF (εt)+ηλ(1−F (εt)))−(1− ρt
ρt
)−θQOCt ))
−1(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)−1β(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)1−θΨOCt+1
β(
Ct+1
Ct
1
ρt+1
)1−θΨOCt+1 = βe
µc(1−θ){(eεt+1)1−θ + η
ˆ εt+1
−∞
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε)+
+ ηλ
ˆ ∞
εt+1
((eεt+1)1−θ − (eε)1−θ)dF (ε))+
+
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
ˆ ∞
−∞
µ((e(τ−1)µc+εt+1+
∑τ
j=2 εt+j(p))1−θ−(e(τ−1)µc+
∑τ
j=1 εt+j(p))1−θ)dp+(eεt+1)1−θψ}
The term µI(u(CF tCt+τ (p))− u(CF t−1Ct+τ (p))) in the agent’s first-order condition prevents
an analytical solution. Instead I have to obtain the function for ρt by numerically
finding a fixed point. The numerical procedures are very robust and pricing errors
are very small. The results when using the ordered comparison are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar to the results under the static comparison excluding future
uncertainty.
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E.3 Comparison to the partial-equilibrium model
The Lucas-tree general-equilibrium setup simplifies the analysis considerably. In a
partial-equilibrium model, in which Rt is i.i.d. and exogenous, the consumption-wealth
ratio appears to be slightly more complicated
ρt =
1
1 + (
ψ+γQ(ηFRt (Rt)+ηλ(1−FRt (Rt)))
1+ηFRt (Rt)+ηλ(1−FRt (Rt))
)
1
θ
.
Q and ψ are constant but need to be solved simultaneously with ρt. Thus, the model
needs to be solved with a simple fixed-point numerical procedure in an infinite-horizon
model. In contrast, in general equilibrium Q and ψ depend on exogenous parameters,
which gives rise to an analytical solution for ρt. Moreover, in the partial-equilibrium
model, it has to be verified that consumption Ct and savings Wt − Ct are increasing
in the return realization Rt. In the Lucas-tree model, this is necessarily the case as
consumption Ct, savings Wt − Ct, and returns are all increasing in εt.
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